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THE NEW AMERICAN CASTE SYSTEM:
THE SUPREME COURT AND DISCRIMINATION AMONG
CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS
Melissa L. Koehn*
Fifteen percent of the decisions issued by the Supreme Court during its 1996-97
Term centered around section 1983. Section 1983 provides civil rights plaintiffs
with a procedural mechanism for vindicating their federally protected rights, in-
cluding those enshrined in the Constitution. The Court's decisions from its
1996-97 Term reflect a continuation of the alarming trend that has permeated
section 1983 for the last two decades-a movement to decrease the scope of section
1983, regardless of the impact on constitutional rights. The Supreme Court ap-
pears to be creating a hierarchy both of constitutional rights and of plaintiffs: free
speech and takings claims are favored at the top of the heap, while prisoner civil
rights actions and suits against police officers are disfavored at the bottom of the
heap. In this Article, Professor Koehn explores the section 1983 decisions from the
1996-97 Term and concludes that they raise a troubling concern that, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, the Supreme Court is creating a system in which
prisoners, Indians, and persons suing police departments are not entitled to full
constitutional protection.
INTRODUCTION
America isn't easy. America is advanced citizenship. You've
gotta want it bad, because it's gonna put up a fight. It's gonna
say, You want free speech? Let's see you acknowledge a man
whose words make your blood boil, who's standing center
stage and advocating at the top of his lungs that which you
would spend a lifetime opposing at the top of yours.
You want to claim this land is a land of the free? Then the
symbol of your country cannotjust be a flag. The symbol also
has to be one of its citizens exercising his right to burn that
flag in protest.
* Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A. 1989, Trinity Univer-
sity; J.D. 1992, University of Michigan Law School. This Article had its genesis in a speech
delivered by the author on October 31, 1997 at the University of Tulsa's Continuing Legal
Education program entitled "Practitioners' Guide to the October 1996 Term of the United
States Supreme Court." The author wishes to thank Larry Cati Backer and Martin H. Belsky
for their comments on an earlier draft and the University of Tulsa Faculty Research Grant
Program for its financial support.
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Now show me that. Defend that. Celebrate that in your class-
rooms. Then you can stand up and sing about the land of the
free.'
The author of these words has clearly captured the theory be-
hind the Bill of Rights-that our constitutional protections exist
not just for those in the majority or for those espousing popular
opinions. Constitutional protections also shield the minority from
attack by those in the majority. They extend protections our soci-
ety has deemed fundamental to all citizens, not just to those whose
views are in vogue at any given moment. The Supreme Court
seems to have forgotten that fundamental purpose of the Bill of
Rights.
During the October 1996 Term, the Supreme Court handed
down 81 opinions. Ten of those were section 19832 cases, and two
others were directly related to section 1983. These cases reflect a
continuation of the alarming trend that has permeated section
1983 decisions for the last two decades-a movement to decrease
the scope of section 1983, regardless of the impact on constitu-
tional rights.4 The Supreme Court appears to be creating a
1. THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT (Castle Rock Entertainment et al. 1995). This speech is
given near the end of the movie by Michael Douglas' character, the President of the United
States.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This statute provides a procedural mechanism for bring-
ing a civil action to vindicate deprivations of federally-protected rights.
3. These two cases are United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), and Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997). Lanier was a criminal action under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the
criminal analogue of section 1983. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271-72 (discussing similarity of
civil and criminal liability under sections 1983 and 242). Section 242 makes it a crime to "
'willfully subject[] any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.. .. ' " Lanier, 520 U.S. at 264 n.3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242). Coeur d'Alene Tribe
was an Eleventh Amendment case in which the Court held that the Ex parte Young exception
did not apply to a suit brought by a federal Indian tribe that sought to quiet title to specific
lands. See Coeur dAlene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2043. Accordingly, the federal courts were barred
from hearing the case. For a discussion regarding the relationship of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and Ex parte Young to section 1983 cases, see infra Part II.A.
4. This trend has been recognized and commented on by many scholars, as well as
members of the Supreme Court. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1985).
Blackmun acknowledges the reduction in the scope of section 1983:
In certain instances, the Court appears inclined to cut back on § 1983 in any way it
can, short of ignoring the language of the statute or existing rulings. The common
theme of some of the recent decisions seems to me to be that § 1983 should be con-
strued to minimize federal judicial intervention in state affairs whenever possible, re-
gardless of the impact on the ability of federal courts to protect constitutional rights.
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hierarchy both of constitutional rights and of plaintiffs: free
speech and takings claims are favored at the top of the heap, while
prisoner civil rights actions and suits against police officers are dis-
favored at the bottom of the heap.
Obviously, the Court cannot, and does not, simply announce,
"Plaintiff, we don't like you; therefore, you lose." Rather, the Court
has created the hierarchy by manipulating the procedural barriers
that must be overcome before the courts can reach the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.5 Plaintiffs raising free speech Claims or takings
claims generally confront relatively low procedural barriers.6 Plain-
tiffs who are prisoners or who sue police officers generally
confront an amazing thicket of procedural snarls which often pre-
vent federal courts from hearing the merits of their claims.7
I do not contend that section 1983 cases are the only area in
which the Supreme Court has manipulated the law-it is common
knowledge that the justices occasionally play fast and loose with
8
rules of law. Instead, this Article is an effort to start the process of
questioning whether the Supreme Court has systematically ma-
nipulated section 1983 law to create a subclass of citizens who are
not entitled to full constitutional protection.9 If so, recognition of
that manipulation is the first step toward correcting it.
Id. at 23-24; see also Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Atten-
tion to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989). Beermann has also recognized this
"hostile" trend:
Commentators have long attacked the Court's method of construing § 1983, charg-
ing the Court with [a variety of motives]. To these allegations I would add the charge
that some Justices are outright hostile to § 1983 and to § 1983 plaintiffs, and veil their
hostility only thinly beneath the most rudimentary, unelaborated "policy arguments."
Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted); see also Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move
From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEo. L.J. 1719, 1791 (1989) ("The increasing use of tort rhetoric
has allowed the Court to transform § 1983, thereby diluting the protection it offers to per-
sons whose constitutional rights have been violated."); Tiffany A. Werner, Note, Edwards v.
Balisok-Is the Court Washing Its Hands of Prisoners' Due Process Rights?, 28 SETON HALL L.
Rv. 650, 654, 677 (1997). See generally Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and
Empathy in Section 1983 Cases, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 819 (1997) [hereinafter Nahmod, Section
1983 Cases].
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See infra notes 366-73 and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. Anyone who has ever studied Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is
aware of this fact.
9. I do not challenge the Court's prior holdings that many constitutional rights do
not operate at full force for people who are incarcerated. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526 (1984) (holding that a prisoner has no Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches); see alsojones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating
that some of a prisoner's constitutional rights may be impinged for security or rehabilitative
purposes); cf Price v.Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 289-92 (1948) (expressing that, while the writ
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Part I of this Article takes a brief look at section 1983 and its ba-
sic requirements with the goal of laying the foundation for
understanding the Court's section 1983 jurisprudence and how
the Court has begun the manipulation process. Part II continues
this examination by focusing on four areas that have provided the
source of many procedural rules: the Eleventh Amendment, quali-
fied immunity, municipal liability, and the overlap between section
1983 and habeas corpus. All four of these areas were before the
Court during the 1996-97 Term. After looking briefly at the his-
torical development of the law in each of these four areas, Part II
will examine how the Court's opinions from the 1996-97 Term
contributed to the development of these procedural barriers. Fi-
nally, Part III will contrast decisions where the Court has raised the
procedural barriers with decisions where the Court has gone out
of its way to collapse those barriers and reach the merits of the
case. Part III concludes by attempting to discern what is motivating
the Court's analysis.
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1983
Section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for vindicating
federally-protected rights.0 The statute declares:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
This statute has changed little since it was first enacted in 1871
as part of the post-Civil War Reconstruction efforts. By the plain
language of the statute, a plaintiff (who must be either a U.S. citi-
zen or a person within the jurisdiction of the United States) must
of habeas corpus has played a major role in lifting restraints on personal liberty, district
courts are not required to grant habeas corpus petitions in cases of numerous and succes-
sive filings by individual prisoners that are deemed to be an abuse of the system). The Court
often seems determined, however, to obstruct prisoners' efforts to enforce even the limited
constitutional rights they do enjoy.
10. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
11. Id.
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prove that the defendant is (1) a person (2) who deprived plaintiff
of a federally-protected right (3) while acting under color of state
law.12 Although the statute seems straightforward and relatively
simple, it actually contains a great deal of ambiguity, at least as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court. These ambiguities include:
* Who is a "person"? Does the word include only
natural persons, or does it also refer to agencies
and other corporate entities?'3
* What is a "federally protected right"? Can a plaintiff
sue under any provision of the Constitution or any
portion of any federal statute?'4
* What does it mean to act "under color of state
law,,?
5
* What is the relevant standard of proof? Who bears
the burden of proof?"1
6
* Are defendants protected by any form of immu-
nity?1
7
Part II will examine some of these ambiguities and how the Court
has dealt with them.
The key thing to remember is that section 1983 is a procedural
mechanism. In and of itself, it conveys no substantive rights. As
part of their suits, section 1983 plaintiffs must plead and prove a
violation of a federally-protected right. This "federally-protected
right" can be either a constitutional or statutory right, but this Ar-
ticle focuses solely on constitutionally-protected rights.'
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989).
14. Certain federal statutes can serve as the basis of a section 1983 action. See infra
note 18 and accompanying text.
15. For an overview of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the "under color of
state law" requirement, seeJOSEPH G. COOK &JOHN G. SOBIESKI,JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
7.10 (1998).
16. The relevant burden of proof varies depending on the specific issue in question.
See id. chs. 2, 3, 7, & 14.
17. Most defendants are covered by some form of immunity. See id. 1 2.06-2.11; see
also infra Part II.B.
18. A plaintiff using section 1983 to enforce a federal statutory right must prove many
of the same basic elements as a plaintiff using section 1983 to vindicate a constitutional
right, but the details of the litigation can differ. For example, not all statutes can be the
subject of a section 1983 action, even if they do create individual rights. Indeed, the Court
recently addressed this precise issue in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). In Blessing,
the Court reiterated that a plaintiff seeking to use section 1983 to enforce a federal statutory
right must prove that: (1) "Congress must have intended that the provision in question
FALL 1998]
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At first glance, section 1983 seems sweeping and its purpose
clear-the statute is both a remedial measure and a preemptive
warning to states. Section 1983 is designed to provide an individual
with a means to enforce constitutionally-protected rights and to
provide states and state employees with a deterrent against violat-
ing those rights. 9 Congress knew that federal resources were
limited and the federal government could not monitor the actions
of every state and local government employee, so section 1983
gives the "man on the street" the ability to enforce his or her own
constitutional rights in court. 
°
To further enable persons seeking to protect federal rights to
bring actions, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in 1976. Section
1988 allows certain "prevailing parties" (including those who filed
suit under section 1983) to recover attorneys' fees as part of their
costs.2 ' The phrase "prevailing party" has become a term of art.
2
The intent, obviously, is to encourage attorneys to pursue civil
rights cases and to make it easier for indigents to find attorneys to
enforce and defend their rights. Section 1988 reinforces the seri-
ousness of Congress' intent to protect the constitutional rights of
all persons within the borders of the United States. Congress did
not want a subclass of poor citizens to develop. The Constitution
protects all citizens, not just those with enough money to fight in
court. Section 1988 is a means to achieve that goal.
In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that
remedial statutes should be interpreted liberally in order to fulfill
Congress' intent. 3 The Court has even declared that section 1983
benefit the plaintiff'; id. at 340; (2) "the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so
'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence"; id. at 340-
41 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32
(1987)); and (3) "the statute ... unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the
States." Id. at 341. Because my purpose in this Article is to focus on our most fundamental
rights (i.e., the rights found in the Constitution), I will not clutter the analysis by addressing
the extra details relevant only to section 1983 suits based on federal statutory rights.
19. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.1-.2 (2d ed. 1994).
20. Section 1983 suits can be filed in state or federal courts: state courts because they
are courts of general jurisdiction, see id. § 3.3, at 199, and federal courts because the suits
present a federal question. See id. § 8.1, at 422.
21. Section 1988 provides, in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section [] ... 1983... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
22. The details of this area of section 1983 jurisprudence are beyond the scope of this
Article, but for a look at the Court's most recent pronouncements in this area, see Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109-12 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987)
(interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act liberally); Corning Glass Works v. Bren-
nan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) (interpreting the Equal Pay Act liberally).
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is just such a remedial statute.14 Given the "prevailing party" doc-
trine and the remedial nature of section 1983, one would think,
then, that the Court would interpret section 1983 broadly because
it was designed to enforce our most precious and fundamental
rights. One would be wrong, at least in cases where the plaintiff is a
prisoner or an Indian, or the plaintiff is suing a police officer. As
the next Part of this Article discusses, rather than interpret section
1983 broadly, the Supreme Court has created instead an array of
procedural hurdles designed to prevent courts from reaching the
merits of many section 1983 actions. 5
II. THE COURT'S SECTION 1983 DECISIONS
FROM THE 1996-97 TERM
Twelve of the Supreme Court's eighty-one opinions in its 1996-
97 Term, a staggering fifteen percent of the Court's docket, were
either cases filed under section 1983 or cases raising related is-
sues.26 In part, section 1983's dominance of the Court's 1996-97
docket can be explained by the fact that section 1983 is a proce-
dural shell. The statute can be used in a variety of cases in a variety
of ways. Indeed, during the 1996-97 Term, the Court used section
1983 cases to, among other things:
24. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) ("As remedial legislation, § 1983 is
to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.").
25. In many respects, these holdings reflect popular sentiment against these groups.
Indeed, public feeling against both prisoner civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions
has run so high in recent years that Congress has turned its attention to limiting the scope
of both types of litigation. See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; cf. Nadine Strossen, The Current Assault on Constitutional
Rights and Liberties: Origins and Approaches, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 769 (1997) (discussing politi-
cally-motivated attacks on constitutional rights). The Supreme Court must be sensitive to
public opinion. See generally ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (2d
ed. 1994). The Court is also supposed to protect against the tyranny of majority. Such pro-
tection is one of the primary reasons for insulating the Court from political pressures by
providing federal judges with life tenure and protection against salary decreases. See U.S.
CONST. art. III; THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
26. These opinions are (in chronological order of decision): Arizonans for OfficialEng-
lish v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997);
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997); Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct.
1734 (1997); Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997); Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807
(1997); Idaho v. Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); and Richardson v. McKnight, 117
S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
FALL1998]
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* Hold that the President is not immune from civil
damages for actions occurring outside his official
duties;27
* Refine and restructure the "custom or policy" re-
quirement for municipal liability;
2 s
Continue foreshadowing a serious restriction upon,
or even the elimination of, the Ex parte Young doc-
trine;2 9 and
Determine that private prison guards are not pro-
tected by qualified immunity. °
Section 1983's breadth is part of its strength, but it also operates
as a weakness. Because Congress wrote the statute with such gener-
ality, the Court has been free, if not required, to fill in the details.
The Court has used this power to "discover" (read: create) numer-
ous procedural hurdles buried in section 1983, hurdles that must
be overcome before the federal courts can reach the merits of the
suit (i.e., the allegation that a constitutional right has been violat-
ed). This section discusses some of the more important procedural
barriers. My purpose is not to provide an exhaustive account of the
procedural barriers under section 1983 or even to provide a thor-
ough discussion of any one barrier. Instead, I provide a sampling
of the types of procedural barriers created by the Supreme Court
and discuss how the Court's decisions from the October 1996
Term have continued the erection of those barriers.
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment has the distinction of being the first
constitutional amendment enacted to overturn a Supreme Court
decision. In 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia,2 the Supreme Court
held that the executors of a South Carolina estate could bring an
27. See Jones, 117 S. Ct. at 1651.
28. See McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1736-38; Brown, 520 U.S. at 405-11.
29. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2034-40.
30. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2107-08.
31. In the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Su-
preme Court established itself as the official and final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution. See id. at 146-47. Consequently, the Court's pronouncements regarding the
meaning of the Constitution can be altered in only two ways-either by a subsequent deci-
sion of the Court itself or by a constitutional amendment.
32. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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action in the Supreme Court to collect a debt owed to the estate by
the State of Georgia. The Court's decision created an uproar 3 and
in 1798, just five years after the Court issued its decision, the Elev-
enth Amendment became part of the Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment simply states: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
34
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, however, has been anything but simple. The Court's
interpretation often has little to do with the Eleventh Amend-
ment's literal language. For example, in Hans v. Louisiana,3 the
Court completely ignored the actual language of the amendment
and extended its prohibition to include suits filed against a state by
one of its own citizens. 6
The Eleventh Amendment has played a major role in the inter-
pretation of section 1983. Many section 1983 suits are directed at
states, state agencies, and/or state employeesY.3  The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment would seem to
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over such suits. After all, they
are "suit[s] in law" that have been "commenced... against one of
the United States.3 s The balance of section 1983 actions are
brought against municipalities and their employees. 9 If the courts
deemed that these defendants should be treated like the state, be-
cause they are subdivisions of the state, it would be conceivable to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment as also barring federal courts
from hearing these actions.
Obviously, because a wealth of section 1983 actions are pursued
in federal courts, the Supreme Court has not used the Eleventh
Amendment to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction in all sec-
tion 1983 suits. Instead, the Supreme Court has drawn a series of
distinctions that allow certain section 1983 actions to be heard by
federal courts. Through one such distinction, the Court has dif-
ferentiated between states and municipalities.4 0 As a result,
33. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 373-74.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
35. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
36. See id. at 21.
37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 422.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 422.
40. See generally Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(distinguishing between states and municipalities for purposes of section 1983 and holding
that municipalities are subject to suit under that statute). Monell overruled the Court's
FALL1998]
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municipalities, subject to certain restrictions discussed below, 4 ' are
amenable to suit under section 1983 without regard to the Elev-
enth Amendment.
The question that remains is how to treat states, as well as their
agencies and employees. Two lines of decisions have provided the
answer to this question. The first line of cases draws a distinction
between states and state agencies on the one hand and state em-
ployees on the other.42 In these cases, the Court has declared that
section 1983 actions cannot be filed against states and state agen-
cies, whether in state or federal court.3 The Eleventh Amendment
does not bar all suits against states. Instead, it simply withholds
federal court jurisdiction for such cases; the Amendment does not,
however, prevent these cases from being filed in state courts.44 This
distinction, then, between states and state employees does not rely
on the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, in a series of cases culminat-
ing in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,4" the Supreme
Court held that states and state agencies are not "persons" for pur-
poses of section 1983.46 Therefore, states and states agencies can
never be sued under section 1983, regardless of whether the suit is
filed in federal or state court.
The Court reiterated this conclusion during the 1996-97 Term
in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.47 Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish arose out of a 1988 Arizona ballot initiative establishing
English as the official language of the state.4s Two days after the
initiative passed, a state employee filed suit under section 1983,
alleging that the initiative violated the U.S. Constitution.4 9 After a
flurry of pretrial motions, only one defendant remained in the liti-
gation-Arizona's Governor Mofford, who was sued in her official
capacity.5s The district court eventually ruled that the initiative was
earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (prohibiting suits against municipali-
ties tinder section 1983).
41. See infra Part I.C.
42. SeeJohn C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REv. 47, 51 (1998) (analyzing "the Eleventh Amendment and section 1983 as an integral
package of liability rules for constitutional violations" and arguing that "[tihe real role of
the Eleventh Amendment is not to bar redress for constitutional violations by states but to
force plaintiffs to resort to section 1983").
43. SeeWill v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989).
44. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
45. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
46. See id. at 71. Recall the discussion above indicating that one element of a sec-
tion 1983 suit is that the defendant be a "person." See supra note 13.
47. 520 U.S. 43, 68-69 (1997).
48. See id. at 49.
49. See id. at 49-50.
50. See id. at 53.
[VOL. 32:1
The New American Caste System
unconstitutional, but it denied plaintiffs request for an injunction,
finding that she had not "established an enforcement threat suffi-
cient to warrant [such] relief."5'
After Governor Mofford announced her intention not to ap-
peal, a number of individuals and organizations sought to
intervene in the litigation. 2 As the case moved around the legal
system, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit issued opin-
ions concerning the various motions to intervene and on a variety
ofjusticability issues.53 One of the primary justiciability issues cen-
tered around the fact that the plaintiff had subsequently resigned
her position with the state.54 Nevertheless, the courts eventually
ruled that the plaintiff still had standing to sue and after another
trip to the district court, she was awarded nominal damages.
55
When the case eventually found its way into the Supreme Court,
the Court focused on the justiciability issues. It initially expressed
doubt about the intervenors' standing, but the Court deferred fi-
nal decision on the issue, preferring instead to focus on the
original plaintiff.56 In an opinion clearly meant to chastise the
Ninth Circuit for losing sight of basic principles,57 the Supreme
Court reiterated that a state is not a "person" capable of being
sued under section 1983.5' The only defendant before the court
was Arizona's governor, appearing in her official capacity. An offi-
cial capacity suit against a state officer is the same as a suit against
the state itself.59 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's assertion that
the state had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
51. Id. at 55.
52. See id. 55-56.
53. See id. at 57-59.
54. See id. at 59-60.
55. See id. at 60-63.
56. See id. at 65-67.
57. The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion contained some rather blunt language.
For example: "Thus, the claim for relief the Ninth Circuit found sufficient to overcome
mootness was nonexistent." Id. at 69;
While we do not rule on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's exclusion of the State as
a party, we note this lapse in that court's accounting for its decision: The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that an intervenor the court had
designated a nonparty could be subject, nevertheless, to an obligation to pay dam-
ages.
Id. at 70; "In advancing cooperation between Yniguez and the Attorney General regarding
the request for and agreement to pay nominal damages, the Ninth Circuit did not home in
on the federal courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned proceedings." Id. at 71;
"Both lower federal courts in this case refused to invite the aid of the Arizona Supreme
Court.... A more cautious approach was in order." Id. at 76-77.
58. See id. at 69.
59. See id. at 69 n.24.
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was unavailing, as such an assertion did not permit the award of
nominal damages against a state.60 Rather than an Eleventh
Amendment immunity problem, the problem was a definitional
one under the language of section 1983.61
States and state agencies cannot be sued under section 1983.
The question remains, however, whether state employees can be
sued under that statute. In a second line of decisions, the Supreme
Court has made a series of distinctions: (1) whether a state em-
ployee is sued in her official or personal capacity,62 and (2)
63
whether the remedy sought is prospective or retroactive. Starting
64
with Ex parte Young, and continuing through a number of other
cases, 65 the Supreme Court addressed the question of a state em-
ployee's capacity by differentiating between prospective and
retroactive remedies. Prospective remedies, such as injunctions,
may be sought against a state employee in both her official and
66personal capacities. Retroactive remedies, specifically damages,
may be pursued only through a personal capacity suit.67 The dis-
tinction between a state employee's personal and official capacities
has become known as the "Ex parte Young doctrine," after the case
that originated it.6
This long entrenched doctrine has suffered a number of hits in
recent Supreme Court Terms, first in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Nor-
ida 9 and most recently in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe.7° Seminole
Tribe was a suit filed by the Seminole Indian tribe against the State
of Florida and its governor under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
60. See id. at 69.
61. See id.
62. The anomaly of allowing a suit to proceed against a state employee in her personal
capacity while at the same time requiring that she act under color of state law has previously
been discussed. See COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 15, at 2.01 [B].
63. The primary case, of course, is Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars the retroactive payment of benefits. Also instructive are
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), holding that the explanatory notice advising applicants
that state administrative procedures exist for determining eligibility for past benefits consti-
tutes permissible prospective relief rather than retroactive award, and Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977), holding that the district court was authorized to provide prospective relief
despite the fact that such relief requires state expenditures.
64. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For more on the relationship between the Eleventh Amend-
ment and Ex pare Young, see Nathan C. Thomas, The Withering Doctrine of Ex parte Young, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1068, 1072-81 (1998).
65. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989); Edelman, 415 U.S. 651.
66. See, e.g., Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-26; Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677.
67. See, e.g., Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-26; Wil, 491 U.S. at 71; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677.
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.5.1, at 390-94; CooK & SOBIESKI, supra note
15, 2.01 [B].
69. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
70. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
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Act.7 The Supreme Court disallowed the suit, finding first that
Congress has no power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity for legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I
powers. 2 The Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine could
not be used to allow suit against Florida's governor because it
would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the remedial scheme Congress
73had established in the statute at issue.
This was a new restriction on the Ex parte Young doctrine. 74 It was
a modest restriction, however, and it impacts only suits seeking to
vindicate federal statutory rights. The Court's decision in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, though, threatens to restrict significantly the Ex parte
Young doctrine in the context of section 1983 actions which seek to
enforce constitutional rights.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe litigation began when the Coeur d'Alene
Indian Tribe and several of its members filed suit in federal court
to quiet title to the beds and banks of all navigable watercourses
and waters within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation. 75 The suit named as defendants the State of Idaho,
various Idaho state agencies, and a number of state officials sued in
their individual capacity.76 The primary issue before the Supreme
Court concerned whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the
litigation.7 7 In a fractured 5-4 decision, the Court held that the
71. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
72. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 53-57.
73. See id. at 73-74. The Court explained its holding: "[W]here Congress has pre-
scribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting
an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Id. at 74. Continuing, the Court
stated:
[T]he fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability that is significantly
more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex
parte Youngstrongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter .... We
hold that Ex parte Young is inapplicable to [the Tribe's] suit against the Governor of
Florida, and therefore that suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be
dismissed for a lack ofjurisdiction.
Id. at 75-76. For more on Seminole Tribe and Ex parte Young, see Thomas, supra note 64, at
1085-92,1104-08.
74. See Bernard Schwartz, Federalism, Administrative Law, and the Rehnquist Court in Ac-
tion, 32 TULSA L.J. 477, 478-79 (1997) (stating that Seminole Tribe limits the Ex parte Young
doctrine in a broad and disturbing manner); cf Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation,
13 ToURo L. REv. 311, 334 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation] (stating
that, although the Supreme Court denied the Ex parte Young remedy, Seminole Tribe did not
overturn the doctrine).
75. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2032.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 2031-32.
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Eleventh Amendment prohibited federal courts from hearing the
litigation, and thus to proceed, the Tribe would have to bring its
suit in state court.
78
Two notable elements emerge from Coeur dAlene Tribe. one
from the explicit premise of the majority and one from an implicit
distinction between state and tribal government. First, all five jus-
tices in the majority reviewed the history of the Eleventh
Amendment and Ex parte Young and agreed that:
To interpret [Ex parte] Young to permit a federal court-action
to proceed in every case where prospective declaratory and in-
junctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his
individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty formal-
ism and to undermine the principle, reaffirmed just last Term
in Seminole Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment immunity repre-
sents a real limitation on a federal court's federal-question
jurisdiction.79
After this agreement, however, the judges split into two camps.
The first camp consisted of Justice Kennedy, who wrote the pri-
mary opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Indeed, the
primary opinion's heart garnered only the votes of these two
members of the Court.80 Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued for sweeping changes in the Ex parte Young doc-
trine. Specifically, they reiterated that states are bound by the
Constitution and contended that state courts are perfectly compe-
tent forums to adjudicate suits seeking to vindicate federal rights."'
This is especially true when "the parties invoke federal principles
to challenge state administrative action." 2 In these cases, "the
courts of the State have a strong interest in integrating those
sources of law within their own system for the proper judicial con-
trol of state officials."8 3 Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist recognized that precedent suggests that the Eleventh
Amendment is not a bar to a suit seeking prospective relief from
individual state officers. 4 They suggested, however, that precedent
78. See id. at 2043.
79. Id. at 2034.
80. As my colleague on the CLE panel, Louis Bullock, noted, Coeur d'Alene Tribe is cer-
tainly an interesting example of the Chief Justice's use of power to designate the author of
an opinion. By choosing Justice Kennedy to write the primary opinion, the Chief Justice
elevated an opinion garnering only two votes to be the primary decision.
81. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2036-38.
82. Id. at 2037-38.
83. Id. at 2038.
84. See id.
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had gone too far, and the Court should look to the context of each
suit to see whether the provision of a federal forum is really neces-
85
sary.
The other three members of the majority wrote separately.
While they, too, were concerned with an over-expansive use of the
Ex parte Young doctrine, they urged more modest changes than the
sweeping changes sought by Kennedy and Rehnquist. The three
concurring justices advocated keeping the basic Ex parte Young rule
that permits an exception to the Eleventh Amendment whenever a
plaintiff names a state official, alleges an ongoing violation of fed-
eral law, and clearly seeks prospective relief. 6 They agreed with
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist that the current suit
could not go forward, but they reached that conclusion by arguing
that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit did not fit the standard rule. 7
According to the concurring justices, the suit did not fit Ex parte
Young's confines because of the nature of the suit."8 Specifically, the
Tribe was seeking to divest a state of all regulatory power over
submerged lands. 9 As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent,
however, this distinction was not reasonable; it ignored the fact
that the Tribe's claim was based on an ongoing violation of federal
law and the Tribe did not seek any retroactive relief.90 In fact, the
Tribe had carefully circumscribed its complaint to seek only pro-
spective relief.91 Arguments about the "nature" of the suit come
very close to eradicating the formalist distinctions created by the
Court in Ex parte Young itself.
Few lawyers, judges, or scholars seriously contend that Ex parte
Young is not a formalist exercise in line-drawing.92 It is, however; an
exercise that has been part of American jurisprudence for a long
time and one that is relatively easy to apply. For a suit to proceed,
the plaintiff need only jump through the correct mechanical
hoops, making sure to list in the complaint whether the defen-
dants are sued in their individual and/or official capacities.93 The
85. See id. at 2038-40.
86. See id. at 2046-47 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
87. See id. at 2043-45 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
88. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 2032.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.5.1, at 392 ("Many have criticized the [Ex
parte] Young decision as creating a fictional distinction between the state and its officers.");
see also Thomas, supra note 64, at 1078-79 (admitting that Ex parte Young is a fiction, but
arguing that it is a necessary fiction).
93. See COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 15, 2.01 [B].
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test is clear, and lower federal courts have little or no trouble ap-
plying it.
94
The same cannot be said of the new tests. First, a court faced
with a section 1983 suit must determine whether the suit is
brought to vindicate constitutional or statutory rights. If the suit
seeks to enforce statutory rights, then the court must determine
whether allowing the suit to proceed would interfere with the re-
medial scheme established by Congress. This is not much more
than what was already required before Seminole Tribe. Currently,
before allowing a section 1983 suit to proceed based on a federal
statutory right, a court must determine whether Congress either
expressly or impliedly foreclosed section 1983 as a remedy. The
courts will find foreclosure by implication if the statute contains a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with in-
dividual enforcement under section 1983.
After Coeur d'Alene Tribe, though, lower courts must now perform
an additional analytical step: they must also determine whether it
"simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit against the State."9
In other words, courts must look at the nature of the suit and the
relief sought and ask themselves whether this is intrinsically a suit
against the state itself.96 Yet there is no meaningful way to deter-
mine whether a suit is basically "a suit against the State," because
all suits invoking Ex parte Young are suits against the state itself. In
reality, the Court in Ex parte Young did not draw a line between
suits against a state and suits which are not against a state. Instead,
the Court drew a line that declared that suits against states can
proceed in federal court despite the Eleventh Amendment. The
line was clear and easy to follow under Ex parte Young, as courts
needed to ask only three questions:
* Did plaintiff name a state official rather than the
state itself in the complaint?97;
* Does plaintiff allege an ongoing violation of a fed-
eral right?98; and
* Does plaintiff seek only prospective relief? 99
If these conditions were met, the suit could proceed. In Coeur
dAlene Tribe, however, the Court directs lower courts to add an im-
94. See id.
95. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
96. See id.
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possible fourth question: Is this a suit against the state itself?. Be-
cause the Court provides no meaningful guidelines for lower
courts to use in trying to answer that question, the question is im-
possible to answer. Consequently, litigants and courts will have to
spend a good deal of time and money arguing over the "nature"
and "essence" of many Ex parte Young suits.
These arguments can lead to only one of two results: abandon
either Coeur d'Alene Tribe or Ex parte Young. The two decisions can-
not exist side by side in any logical, reasoned manner. The
fundamental premises of the decisions are completely incompati-
ble. Ex parte Young rests on the concept that a state cannot vest its
officers with the authority to engage in unconstitutional conduct.100
This premise makes it possible for federal courts to ensure that
states comply with the U.S. Constitution.0 ' Coeur d'Alene Tribe, how-
ever, surrenders the authority of the federal courts to enforce
federal law, leaving that task (at least for the case at bar) to the
state courts. Unless Coeur d'Alene Tribe is limited to its admittedly
unique facts, it has the real potential to wreak havoc on the previ-
ously clear boundaries of the Ex parte Young doctrine. 2
The second element that emerges regarding the Court's Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence is an insidious element of racism.
In Coeur d Alene Tribe, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognized that a federal forum can play an important role in me-
diating structural disputes between federal and state interests.
0 3
The primary opinion failed to recognize, however, that these same
structural concerns exist in disputes involving tribal and state in-
terests. 1 4 Indeed, as Justice Souter recognized in his dissenting
opinion, state courts have been historically hostile to the claims of
tribes and tribal members.' 5
It is hard to escape the fact that the two recent decisions rein-
vigorating the Eleventh Amendment have come in decisions
involving Indian tribes.10 6 On one hand, it could be argued that
this is simple coincidence: these cases arrived before the Court at
just the right time (or the wrong time, depending on your perspec-
tive). The Court was primed and ready to reinvigorate the
100. See id. § 7.5.1, at 393.
101. See id.
102. For further criticism of Coeur d'Alene Tribe, see Thomas, supra note 64, at 1108-15.
Thomas further states: "The doctrine of Ex parte Young must survive in order to enable indi-
viduals to assert their federal fights, and the Edelman v. Jordan decision reflects the proper
approach to that doctrine." Id. at 1100-01.
103. See Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2037.
104. See id. at 2036-38.
105. See id. at 2056 n.I1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 2028; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
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Eleventh Amendment, and Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene Tribe
provided two handy fact situations to allow the Court to continue
this process.107
On the other hand, a more insidious explanation also can be of-
fered. Rarely in the past two decades has the Court passed up an
• 108
opportunity to erode tribal sovereignty. Seminole Tribe and Coeur
dAlene Tribe allowed the Court to "kill" two birds with one stone,
simultaneously reducing tribal sovereignty and decreasing federal
court jurisdiction over a vast array of section 1983 cases. Although
Coeur d'Alene Tribe was not itself a section 1983 action, the reason-
ing of the majority easily transfers to suits brought under that
statute. As Justice Souter stated in his dissenting opinion, the prin-
cipal distinction drawn by the majority is that the tribe's suit
pierces the barrier between a state official's actions and action by
the state itself, as the remedy sought must essentially come from
the state, not the individual state officer.' °9 This distinction falls of
its own weight, as "an officer suit implicating title is no more or
less the 'functional equivalent' of an action against the govern-
ment than any other [Ex parte] Young suit.... and if the Court's
reasoning were good in a tide case it would be good in any [Ex
parte] Young case. '' H
The theme, then, that emerges from the Court's Eleventh
Amendment cases from the October 1996 Term is one of empow-
ering and/or protecting states. Arizonans for Official English"'
reaffirmed that states and state agencies cannot be defendants in a
107. It has been argued that one way to "contain" these two decisions, and thereby pre-
vent the erosion of the Ex parte Young doctrine, is to limit them to their facts, to be
applicable only to Indian tribes. See Thomas, supra note 64, at 1112-14. Although not fa-
vored by Thomas, I still find this to be a disturbing argument, as it can be read as saying
"sacrifice the Indians to save the rest of the populace." This interpretation fits with the
theme of this Article-that certain disfavored groups are not receiving the same constitu-
tional protections as other Americans.
108. For an excellent analysis of this trend, see Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based
and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55
U. PrT. L. REV. 1 (1993). There have, of course, been some exceptions to this trend. The
three most notable are Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (requiring
certain litigants to exhaust tribal remedies before filing suit in federal court); National Farm-
ers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (requiring certain
litigants to exhaust tribal remedies before filing suit in federal court); and Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that a private federal right of action cannot be
implied into the Indian Civil Rights Act). Of course, the Court's recent decision in Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), has the potential to undermine both National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual. See Melissa L. Koehn, CivilJurisdiction: The Boundaries Between Federal
and Tribal Courts, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705 (1997).
109. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2052 (Souter,J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2053 (Souter,J., dissenting).
111. 520 U.S. 43(1997).
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section 1983 action.112 Coeur d'Alene Tribe suggests that it also will be
harder to sue states through the back door by naming state em-
ployees in their official capacities as defendants.1 1 3 Although these
restrictions do not affect damages actions brought against state
employees in their individual capacities, plaintiffs in such suits still
face the issue of the defendant's qualified immunity, which is dis-
cussed in the next section.
B. Qualified Immunity
As the previous section makes clear, state employees are a pri-
mary target of section 1983 suits. Once such a suit has been filed,
the question arises whether the employee defendant is protected
by any form of immunity. This question, of course, also arises when
municipal employees are sued. This section focuses on state and
municipal employees sued in their individual capacities by a plain-
tiff who is seeking damages.
1 1 4
Section 1983 itself does not address explicitly the issue of im-
munity for any defendant.1 5 In resolving the issue of whether
employee defendants are immune in section 1983 suits, the Su-
preme Court could have held that, since section 1983 is meant to
be a remedial statute and does not explicitly provide for any im-
munity, no such immunity exists. The Court did not, however,
choose to take this path. Instead, the Court has interpreted section
1983 to include all the relevant common law immunities that ex-
isted in 1871 when the statute was enacted." 6
It is not my intent to debate the wisdom or accuracy of this deci-
sion." 7 Instead, I will explore the effect this decision has had on
section 1983 litigation. Although the Court has extended absolute
immunity to judicial and legislative actions, 1 8 it is not those decisions
112. See supra text accompanying notes 47-61.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75-101.
114. See supra Part II.A (discussing suits against states and official capacity suits against
state employees); infra Part II.C (discussing issues of official capacity suits against municipal
employees and suits against municipalities themselves).
115. See supra note 17.
116. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 8.6.1, at 459-60.
117. This issue has been explored by other commentators. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar,
Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L.
REv. 741 (1987).
118. See CHEMERlNSKY, supra note 19, § 8.6.2, at 463. The type of liability which applies,
absolute or qualified, is dependent on the character of the defendant's challenged action-
whether it was judicial, legislative, or executive. The Supreme Court reiterated this princi-
ple in Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1644 (1997).
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which provide the most trouble for lower courts. The culprit there
has been the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The Court has extended qualified immunity to most executive
branch officials. Qualified immunity applies when these officials
are sued for damages, and its roots trace back to the 1967 case of
Pierson v. Ray."5° The current formulation of qualified immunity,
however, is much more favorable to defendants than the one ini-
tially put forth in Pierson.120 The key cases establishing this new test
are Harlow v. Fitzgerald2 ' and Anderson v. Creighton.2 2 Under Harlow
and Anderson, a defendant in a damages action is shielded by quali-
fied immunity unless his actions violated a clearly established law
of which a reasonable person would have known.123
The Supreme Court issued two qualified immunity decisions in
its 1996-97 Term: one analyzing qualified immunity's procedural
aspects, 124 and another addressing whether it can be extended to
private prison guards.2 5 Johnson v. Fankelt26 represents the third
time in three years that the Court has elaborated on the proce-
119. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson, the court held that the defense of good faith and
probable cause was available to police officers in a section 1983 claim. See id. at 557.
120. See, e.g., Nahmod, Section 1983 Cases, supra note 4. Nahmod states:
Whatever the explanation, in the real world of § 1983 litigation qualified immunity
has become a remarkably potent defense for defendants. This is not only the result
of pro-defendant doctrinal changes in the elements of the qualified immunity test,
but also because the procedural ground rules have been changed for the benefit of
§ 1983 defendants .... As a structural matter, these changes in the substantive and
procedural doctrines privilege the § 1983 defendant's narrative and marginalize the
counter-narrative of the plaintiff, thereby directing the qualified immunity decision-
maker-the judge-to empathize more with the defendant than with the injured
plaintiff.
Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted).
121. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, the Court held "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818.
122. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). In Anderson, the Court held that no exception to the general
rule of qualified immunity exists for warrantless searches of third parties' homes. See id. at
646.
123. See generally Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's Manua4 26 IND. L. REV.
187 (1993) (summarizing and organizing qualified immunity analysis). Professor Blum has
also examined whether some form of heightened pleading should be required in the con-
text of individual capacity suits. See Karen M. Blum, Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After
Leatherman , 44 CATH. U. L. Rv. 59 (1994).
124. SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 (1997) (holding that a state does not
have to provide for an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity).
125. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2108 (1997) (holding that qualified
immunity cannot be extended to private prison guards).
126. 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
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dural aspects of qualified immunity.17 Each of these three cases
grew out of the Court's 1985 decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth.'28 In
Mitchell, the Court held that a district court order rejecting a sec-
tion 1983 defendant's qualified immunity defense is an
immediately appealable "final decision.' 29 Eleven years later, in
Behrens v. Pelletier, 13 the Court declared that the Mitchell rule ap-
plied to each rejection of qualified immunity, allowing sec-
tion 1983 defendants to bring interlocutory appeals from both
denials of motions to dismiss and denials of motions for summary
judgment.3 1 Thus, a section 1983 defendant may be able to inter-
rupt the pretrial process with two separate interlocutory appeals on
the issue of qualified immunity.
Mitchell, Behrens, and Johnson v. Jones 13 were all cases litigated en-
tirely in the federal court system. 3 3 In contrast, Fankell made its way
through the Idaho state courts and came to the Supreme Court
through a writ of certiorari to the Idaho Supreme Court.34 Indeed,
this difference supplied the issue in dispute in Fankell: does the
Mitchell rule apply in state courts?
35
The case began when Kristine Fankell was fired from her posi-
tion as a liquor store clerk.3 6 She sued her employers, the Idaho
Liquor Dispensary, alleging that they had deprived her of property
without due process of law.37 Defendants raised the issue of quali-
fied immunity, claiming that "they reasonably believed that
[Fankell] was a probationary employee who had no property inter-
est in her job."3 8 The trial court denied the motion for summary
127. In addition to Fankell the other cases involving procedural aspects of qualified
immunity are Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304
(1995).
128. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
129. See id. at 525; see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 311 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the
general federal appellate jurisdiction statute).
130. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
131. See id. at 307. Jones distinguished a limited set of circumstances when such inter-
locutory appeals are not available. The Jones rule applies when the record in a particular
case demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's conduct
amounted to a clear violation of the Constitution. See Jones, 515 U.S. at 313. For a further
discussion about the relationship between Behrens and Jones, see Schwartz, Section 1983 Liti-
gation, supra note 74, at 320-22.
132. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
133. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 302 (stating that respondent brought suit in federal court);
Jones, 515 U.S. at 307-08 (stating thatJones initiated the action in federal district court prior
to appealing to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 515 (stating that
Forsythe filed suit in the United States Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
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judgment, and defendants attempted to appeal to the Idaho Su-
preme Court.13 9 That court refused to hear the appeal, holding
that the trial court's order was not immediately appealable."O De-
fendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the right to an immediate appeal is a federal right
and that Idaho must allow such an appeal in a section 1983 case,
even if the state's procedures normally would not permit such an
interlocutory appeal. 141 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
agreed to hear the case.142
At first blush, defendants' argument seems very appealing. The
Supreme Court has clearly been concerned over the past two dec-
ades with the burdens that section 1983 litigation has placed on
state and local employees. 143 It was this concern that led the Court
to restructure the qualified immunity tests in Harlow and Ander-144
son. This concern also motivated the Court to permit
interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immunity.14 ' In-
deed, in Fankell, the Court rearticulated the philosophy behind
these decisions:
This "qualified immunity" defense is valuable to officials as-
serting it for two reasons. First, if it is found applicable at any
stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the
litigation by shielding the official from damages liability. Sec-
ond, when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly
established law or when discovery fails to uncover evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue whether the defendant
committed such a violation, it provides the defendant with an
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1802-04.
142. See id. at 1803.
143. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1996) (allowing qualified immunity
defense by a government official at motion to dismiss and summary judgement stages of the
case); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (extending qualified immunity
protection to FBI officials when their actions are deemed reasonable); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 520-21 (1985) (denying absolute immunity protection to the Attorney Gen-
eral and granting only qualified immunity unless his actions clearly violate established law);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (granting only a qualified immunity to ex-
ecutive aides).
144. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (defining qualified immunity as applying when "a rea-
sonable official would understand that what he is doing violates" a constitutional right);
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (concluding that qualified immunity attaches as long as conduct
does not violate "clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have
known").
145. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 308.
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immunity from the burdens of trial as well as a defense to li-
ability.
146
A wrongful denial of qualified immunity at the pretrial stage
could erroneously subject defendants to the litigation burdens that
the Court is concerned with avoiding. Thus, allowing an interlocu-
tory appeal of a trial court's decision to reject qualified immunity
gives defendants an opportunity to protect themselves from the
wrongful impositions of these burdens. Of course, time and ex-
pense is still involved in an appeal, but generally it will be far less
costly than the burdens of an actual trial.
These same burdens fall upon defendants regardless of whether
the suit is litigated in a state or a federal forum. Accordingly, the
Idaho state defendants could meaningfully argue that they should
be entitled to the same interlocutory appeal that they would have
received in federal court. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
that argument and refused to require states to ignore their own
neutral procedural rules by providing these interlocutory ap-
peals. 147
Two, and possibly three, factors motivated the Court's decision.
The first factor is the Court's recurring theme of protecting state
sovereignty:
Petitioners' argument for pre-emption is bottomed on their
claims that the Idaho rules are interfering with their federal
rights. While it is true that the defense has its source in a fed-
eral statute (§ 1983), the ultimate purpose of qualified
immunity is to protect the state and its officials from overen-
forcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's
application of the State's procedural rules in this context is
thus less an interference with federal interests than a judgment
about how best to balance the competing state interests of lim-
iting interlocutory appeals and providing state officials with
immediate review of the merits of their defense.
4
1
In other words, the Court developed the qualified immunity test
and its attendant procedures to protect state and local employ-
ees, both from the litigation costs involved in section 1983
actions and from interference by the federal government into
realms of state decisionmaking. 149 If states do not choose to extend
146. Fanke, 117 S. Ct. at 1803.
147. See id. at 1805-06.
148. Id. at 1805.
149. See id.
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the same protection to their employees in state court, then the
federal government will not interfere. In a way, the same philoso-
phy that led to the interlocutory appeals in federal court allows
state courts to disallow them. This is the idea that states should re-
tain a sphere of autonomy free from federal interference.
A second potential motivating factor does not appear explicitly
in the opinion, but may have been in the Justices' minds as they
cast their votes. Federal law does provide a mechanism, removal,
through which the defendants in Fankell could have received their
interlocutory appeal. A long-standing feature of federal procedure
has been the ability of defendants to remove cases involving fed-
eral questions from state to federal court.51 In addition, there are
special removal statutes for civil rights cases, reinforcing defen-
dants' ability to have a federal court hear the case. 152 Defendants
arguably gave up their right to an interlocutory appeal on the
qualified immunity issue when they failed to remove the case to
federal court. Although the Fankell defendants could not have
known definitively that they were making this choice, they must
have considered that it was a possibility. Future section 1983 de-
fendants are now on notice that they must choose between
remaining in state court and maintaining the ability to pursue an
interlocutory appeal should they lose a pretrial motion on quali-
fied immunity grounds.
53
Beyond the two factors of protecting state sovereignty and rely-
ing on removal as a mechanism to ensure the right to an
interlocutory appeal, a third factor might also have been present.
Fankell did not fit the stereotypical mold of the frivolous section
1983 plaintiff because she was not a state prisoner nor was she su-
ing a police department. Rather, she was a state employee
essentially suing for wrongful termination.5 4 The fact that she did
not fit that stereotypical mold may have made it easier for the
Court to reach the decision it did, a decision that avoids imposing
upon her the delay and expense of an interlocutory appeal. The
Court probably would have reached the same decision regardless
of her status, in light of the fact that its decision was ultimately a
protection of state sovereignty, but it is interesting to note that a
potentially close call went for the plaintiff in this case.
150. Justice Stevens wrote the Fankell opinion for a unanimous Court. See id. at 1802.
151. See28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
152. See28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1994).
153. Of course, this presupposes that the state does not allow such appeals-if a state
does allow interlocutory appeals in these circumstances, no choice need be made.
154. See Fankell, 117 S. Ct. at 1802.
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In some ways, however, the Court's second qualified immunity
decision during the 1996-97 Term undercuts that theory. In Rich-
ardson v. McKnight,5 5 the Supreme Court held that qualified
immunity is not available to private prison guards.156 Richardson was
a stereotypical prisoner case in which Ronnie Lee McKnight, a
state prisoner, claimed that two prison guards injured him when
they used unduly tight restraints. 5 7 The critical difference, how-
ever, between a traditional prisoner suit and the case at hand was
that Tennessee, following a growing trend, 15 had privatized the
management of some of its prisons, and McKnight was housed in
one of those private facilities.'5 9 Thus, the guards who allegedly in-
jured him were employees of a private firm, rather than Tennessee
state employees.
16°
The plain language of section 1983 requires that a defendant act
"under color of state law" before being held liable under the stat-
ute. l6 Thus, defendants generally will be state or municipal
employees, or perhaps even municipalities themselves.' 62 Occa-
sionally, however, a private party can be so connected with the
state that he becomes subject to the strictures of section 1983. 63 In
its 1992 decision Wyatt v. Cole,64 the Supreme Court addressed
whether private parties in this situation are entitled to the protec-
tions of qualified immunity.6 5 Although Wyatt did not answer the
question presented in Richardson, it did provide the framework for
155. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
156. See id. at 2108. As with several other opinions discussed in this Article, Richardson
was a 5-4 decision. See id. One major difference, however, exists between this 5-4 decision
and the others: in Richardson, Justice O'Connor voted with the four justices usually in the
minority-Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg-rather than with the block consisting of
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, thus putting the conservatives in the minority for
this one case. See id. at 2102.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 2104.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See supra notes 11-12, 15 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of municipal liability, see discussion infra Part II.C.
163. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161-62 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 932-35 (1982).
164. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
165. Wyatt raised the question of whether a private individual sued for his role in seiz-
ing property pursuant to a writ of replevin could claim governmental immunity. The
Supreme Court held that he could not, but left open the question of whether he could raise
a good faith defense. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169. For analyses of the Court's decision in Wyatt,
see Scott C. Arakaki & Robert E. Badger, Jr., Note, Wyatt v. Cole and Qualified Immunity for
Private Parties in Section 1983 Suits, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 735 (1994), and David Lagos,
Note, Damned If You Do... The Supreme Court Denies Qualified Immunity to Section 1983 Private
Party Defendants in Wyatt v. Cole, 71 N.C. L. REv. 849 (1993).
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resolving that issue: an analysis both of history and of the purposes
underlying qualified immunity.
166
The majority's review of history led it to conclude that private
prison guards are not a new phenomenon, and neither is the im-
position of liability for their wrongs. The majority also declared
that private prison guards were not historically provided with any
immunity from such liability 6s Accordingly, the Richardson Court
concluded that history did not support the extension of qualified
immunity to the defendants.' 9
The four dissenting justices took issue with the majority's his-
torical analysis, both with the result and with the methods the
majority used to reach those results.170 The dissenters also disa-
greed with the majority's conclusion that the policies behind
qualified immunity were not applicable in the private prison con-
text, as the forces of the marketplace would protect against
insufficiently vigorous performance and against any possibility that
talented people would be deterred from working in thesejobs.171
The primary difference between the majority and the dissent re-
volves around the dissent's insistence that immunity should be
based on a functional analysis, rather than on history or policy.1
The dissent argued that, because private and public prison guards
perform the same function, private prison guards should be enti-
tled to the same qualified immunity as publicly employed prison
guards. 73 The majority disagreed, holding instead that the func-
tional approach applies only when a court was deciding what type
of immunity applied-either absolute or qualified. The approach
should not be applied when a court is addressing the threshold
question of whether any type of immunity is warranted.
74
The Richardson decision is interesting in two respects. First, it is
very intriguing that, despite Justice Scalia's usual insistence on fo-
cusing on the role of tradition and history, 75 he authored a
166. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2104 ("[Wyatt] does tell us, however, to look both to
history and to the purposes that underlie government employee immunity.").
167. See id. at 2104-05.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 2108.
170. See id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lone pre-section 1983 case
appeared to have granted immunity to the independent contractor).
171. See id. at 2110-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a market analysis is inappro-
priate where public officials spending tax dollars are the only purchasers).
172. See id. at 2109-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 2106.
175. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529
(1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw (1997)). Professor Sunstein states:
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dissenting opinion which advocated a functional approach to
qualified immunity.176 Not only did he argue that history was of
lesser importance here, he did so in the face of numerous past
cases where the Court has held that immunity should be viewed
historically.' 77 Ironically, it was the five justices in the majority who
used the historical approach to support a decision in favor of a sec-
tion 1983 plaintiff.
7 8
Indeed, the fact that this decision was a close call decided in fa-
vor of the prisoner plaintiff is the second interesting fact about this
decision. The apparent plaintiff victory, however, is undercut by
the three caveats the majority placed on its decision. The first ca-
veat concerns the liability of private prison guards under section
1983.179 Since the lower courts assumed the defendants were sub-
ject to section 1983, the Supreme Court also focused its decision
solely on the issue of immunity, ignoring the prior question of
whether these private prison guards were even subject to section
1983. is° The interconnection between states and private prisons,
however, should ultimately lead to a decision that section 1983 ap-
plies in this context.
The second caveat is that the Court's decision is limited to its
context and does not address the situation of "a private individual
briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to
government in an essential governmental activity, or acting under
close official supervision." 8' This, too, is not all that troublesome,
as it basically reiterates the fundamental principle of the American
Justice Scalia'a attack on the common law legacy is thus rooted in distrust of particu-
larism-especially judicial particularism-and in enthusiasm for rule-bound
interpretation that relies, in both statutory and constitutional interpretation, on a
single foundation: the meaning of the relevant legal text as it was understood at the time of
the enactment.
Id. at 531.
176. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2108-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (stating that past holdings
on section 1983 immunities were based on "a considered inquiry into the immunity histori-
cally accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 8.6.1, at 459 ("The Court repeatedly has stated that ... the
nature of an officer's immunity is determined, in large part, by an examination of the law as
it existed in 1871.").
178. The Court's use of history in immunity cases has been criticized. See generally
Matasar, supra note 117. The Court's policy analysis in these cases has also been criticized.
See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 4. The Court's use of both history and policy in Wyatt has also
been criticized. See Arakaki & Badger, supra note 165, at 755-63.
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legal system that similar cases should be treated similarly, but a ma-
jor difference in the facts could lead to a different outcome.
The third caveat, however, is the potentially dangerous one. The
Court's decision is limited solely to the issue of qualified immunity.
The Court did not address whether some other type of "good
faith" defense might be available to defendants. 1 2 Given the frac-
tured nature of the Court,1 8 3 its often conservative slant, and its
hostility toward most section 1983 cases involving prisoners and
suits against police departments, it is quite likely that the Court will
formulate some type of good faith defense to protect private
prison guards. Indeed, the Court's protectiveness toward police
departments found voice in both of the municipal liability cases
decided in the 1996-97 Term. Those cases are discussed in the
next section.
C. Municipal Liability
The current era of municipal liability traces back to 1978 and
Monell v. Department of Social Services. Prior to Monell, municipali-
ties-usually counties and/or cities-were not subject to suit
under section 1983.1 5 Monell, however, changed that, and two dec-
ades later, courts (including the Supreme Court) are still trying to
define the boundaries and contours of municipal liability.
The problem is a fundamental one. How does a city and/or a
county violate someone's constitutional rights? Technically speak-
ing, the corporate entity itself is incapable of acting in the
traditional sense. Rather, it must act through its agents and em-
ployees. At the same time the Supreme Court "created" municipal
liability, however, it rejected the notion that a municipality could
be liable for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat su-
perior.1s 6 Instead, before a municipality can be held responsible for
182. See id. at 2108.
183. Richardson was, after all, a 5-4 decision. See id. at 2102.
184. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell was a section 1983 action challenging New York City's
policy of requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence. See id. at 660-61.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of section 1983 and de-
termined that municipalities are "persons" subject to liability under that statute. See id. at
701. This holding was an about-face and required the Court to reverse its decision in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Monell 436 U.S. at 700.
185. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (holding that Congress did not intend to cover munici-
pal corporations under section 1983).
186. See MoneU, 436 U.S. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory."). For an argument that respondeat superior should be allowed,
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a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must present some evidence of
an activity or decision that can be attributed to the municipality
itself.1s7 Following the Supreme Court's language in Monell, this has
become known as the "custom or policy requirement.""' That is, a
plaintiff must show that the unconstitutional deprivation occurred
as a result of a custom or policy belonging to the municipality it-
self. The errant actions of one municipal employee are not
enough.'89
For two decades, the courts have struggled to develop rules and
requirements of proof to help determine when something is a
municipal custom or policy.'90 Generally speaking, a "policy" is at
least something that can be traced to a writing or an affirmative
decision by municipal policymakers.'9 ' A "custom" is usually an
unwritten understanding that is so pervasive it has the force of a
"policy. ,1 92 Obviously, it is generally easier to prove the existence of
a "policy" than a "custom." Regardless, in both instances, the offi-
cial custom or policy must be attributable to the municipality's
policymakers. 9 3 Thus, the first challenge confronting plaintiffs
see Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 147 (arguing to hold supervisory officials accountable for negligently oversee-
ing subordinates).
187. See Monell,436 U.S. at 691-92.
188. Id. at 691.
189. See id. at 691-92. Just as with state governments, a suit against a municipal em-
ployee in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.
There is one major difference between the two situations, however. State employees may be
sued in their official capacities for prospective relief only; they cannot be sued for retroac-
tive relief (i.e., money damages). Municipal employees, however, can be sued for monetary
damages in their official capacity, so long as the requisite burdens are met (i.e., proof of
custom and/or policy and proof of causation). See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text.
190. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (holding that
whether a particular official is a "policymaker" is a question of state law); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (holding that a city can be liable for failure to train an
employee); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(holding that not all decisions by municipal officials will satisfy the custom or policy re-
quirement); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 485 (1986) (holding that under
certain circumstances a single decision by a "policymaker" is sufficient to satisfy the custom
or policy requirement); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 833 (1985) (holding
that, in the absence of other evidence, a single, isolated incident is insufficient to satisfy
custom or policy requirement).
191. SeeCooK & SOBIESKI, supra note 15,1 2.05[B] [11, at 2-156.
192. See id. (stating that the Monell court defined custom as "persistent and widespread
or permanent and well-settled practices").
193. See id. 2.05[A], at 2-142.
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usually is determining who is the relevant final policymaker for
purposes of litigation.194
As with most corporate entities, municipalities spread their poli-
cymaking functions among several groups or individuals, such as
city councils, mayors, county commissioners, and sheriffs. 95 Each
state has the freedom to organize its municipal structures however
it sees fit; indeed, each state may delegate these decisions to the
municipalities themselves, leading to diversity of organization
within a particular state. 196 In recognition of this diversity, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly declared that the determination of
whether an official possesses final policymaking authority is an is-
sue of state law.
197
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this declaration during the
1996-97 Term in McMillian v. Monroe County.!" McMillian arose
out of the 1986 murder of Ronda Morrison in Monroe County,
Alabama. 99 Walter McMillian was originally convicted of the mur-
der and sentenced to death, but the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed the conviction because the prosecutors failed to
disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense. °° After his
release, McMillian brought a section 1983 action against Monroe
County and several of its officials, including Tom Tate, the county
sheriff.' McMillian sued Tate in his official capacity and accused
him of intimidating a person into making a false statement and of
suppressing exculpatory evidence.2  The district court dismissed
the suit against Tate, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.02 Both
courts held that Monroe County had no law enforcement author-
ity, so technically Tate could not be a final policymaker for the
county in that area.204
194. For a discussion of various problems caused by this approach, see Barbara
Kritchevsky, A Return to Owen: Depersonalizing Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 41
VILL. L. REv. 1381, 1393-1444 (1996).
195. See generally CooK & SOBIESKI, supra note 15, 2.05.
196. See id.
197. SeeJett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Pra-
protnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion).
198. 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
199. See id. at 1736.
200. See id. Ronda Morrison's murder, the botched investigation, and the trial are the
subject of the book, PETE EARLEY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: DEATH, LIFE, AND JUSTICE
IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1995).
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The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. 25 Because both
sides agreed that Tate was the final policymaker in the area of law
enforcement, the Supreme Court was faced only with the question
of whether Tate worked for the county or the state when he acted
in his law enforcement capacity. 0 6 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that Alabama county sheriffs are actually state employees.0 7 As
with virtually all the 5-4 decisions in section 1983 cases, the major-
ity consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, while the dissent con-
sisted of Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, a very
unconvincing analysis of Alabama constitutional and statutory pro-
visions. Four conclusions, however, do emerge from the Court's
opinion. First, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that state law gov-
erns the determination of whether a particular official is a
municipal policymaker 1° Second, the review of state law will be a
very deferential one on several levels.21 ' Third, the intricacies of
the Court's analysis limit its relevance to suits arising in Alabama.
Fourth and finally, the Supreme Court is making it more difficult
213to sue municipalities. I elaborate on these conclusions below.
The Court explicitly stated as part of its analysis that it would
give considerable deference to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, as
that Circuit encompasses the State of Alabama and presumably has
more experience with Alabama law.214 While on one hand, this dec-
laration is understandable, an interpretation of state law is just
that-a determination of law, which is usually reviewed de novo.
The deference to the Eleventh Circuit, however, is not the disturb-
ing one; the disturbing deference is that given to Alabama law.
205. See id. at 1736.
206. See id. at 1736-37.
207. See id. at 1736.
208. See id. at 1735. The exception for the purposes of this Article is Richardson v.
McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997). See supra Part II.B.
209. See McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1735-42.
210. See id. at 1737 ("We simply ask whether Sheriff Tate represents the State or the
county when he acts in a law enforcement capacity.... [O]ur inquiry is dependent on an
analysis of state law.").
211. See id.
212. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
213. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
214. See McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1737 ("Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
includes Alabama, we defer considerably to that court's expertise in interpreting Alabama
law."). The Court reinforced this declaration in a footnote, stating: "We note that two of the
three judges on the Eleventh Circuit's panel are based in Alabama. In addition, this is the
second Eleventh Circuit panel to have reached this conclusion." Id. at 1737 n.3.
FALL 1998]
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
The Court's determination that Alabama county sheriffs are
state actors was based on certain provisions in the Alabama Consti-
215tution, the interpretation of those provisions by the Alabama
Supreme Court,216 and on some nebulous Alabama statutes. 17 As
the dissent notes, the primary support for the majority's conclu-
sion stems from a section of the Alabama Constitution which lists
"a sheriff for each county" as part of the state's executive depart-
ment.2 8 This reliance is very interesting, given that it comes just
two paragraphs after the majority declared that states cannot
"answer the question for us by, for example, simply labeling as a
state official an official who clearly makes county policy."2 1 9 Yet,
that is what the Court allowed Alabama to do; it accepted Ala-
bama's decision to "label" its sheriffs as state employees. 220 This is
problematic because it allows a state to define away liability for its
221
municipalities through its definition of municipal employees -
something that is to the great advantage of those municipalities,
but to the detriment of section 1983 plaintiffs.
The majority reinforced its discussion of the Alabama constitu-
tional provisions with a look at how the Alabama Supreme CourtS* 222
has interpreted those provisions (which, obviously, carries the
same risk of allowing the state to define away the liability of its
municipalities), and with a very muddled discussion of several Ala-
bama statutes. I will not detail this discussion, except to say that the
dissent's analysis of the relevant Alabama law is much more con-
vincing than that of the majority. The dissent summarized its
analysis in the following paragraph:
A sheriff locally elected, paid, and equipped, who autono-
mously sets and implements law enforcement policies
operative within the geographic confines of a county, is ordi-
narily just what he seems to be: a county official. Nothing in
Alabama law warrants a different conclusion. It makes scant
sense to treat sheriffs' activities differently based on the pres-
ence or absence of state constitutional provisions of the
222limited kind Alabama has adopted.
215. See id. at 1738.
216. See id. at 1738-39.
217. See id. at 1739.
218. Id. at 1743 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1737.
220. See id. at 1737-39.
221. See discussion supra Part H.A.
222. See McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1738-39.
223. Id. at 1746 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
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This battle over the interpretation of Alabama law leads me to
my third conclusion: the details of the Court's analysis, in both the
majority and dissenting opinions, are virtually irrelevant to section
1983 suits arising out of any state except Alabama, and it is relevant
only to a limited subset of suits arising out of Alabama. Indeed, the
dissent recognized this, declaring that "the Court's Alabama-
specific approach . . . assures that today's immediate holding is of
limited reach .... Thus, the Court's opinion, while in my view mis-
guided, does little to alter § 1983 county and municipal liability in
most jurisdictions."2 2 4
That limitation raises the question of why the Supreme Court
even agreed to hear McMillian. After all, it essentially said that
both the district court and the court of appeals did the right thing.
Why did the Supreme Court spend its valuable time to issue a deci-
sion that appears to have little impact, even on the litigation at
hand? The Court's analysis does little to provide any help or guid-
ance to the confused issue of determining exactly who is a
municipal final policymaker, except in cases involving Alabama
sheriffs sued for actions taken in their law enforcement capacity.
The Court only reiterated that the issue was one of state law-but
we already knew that, and the lower courts in McMillian had pro-
ceeded on that premise. Indeed, they had reached the same
decision, for virtually the same reasons, as the Supreme Court. On
the surface, this decision changed nothing and provided little, if
any, general guidance for future courts wrestling with this issue.
On a deeper level, however, the Court did use McMillian to send
a message. That message is the basis of my fourth conclusion about
this decision: the Court is making it much more difficult to hold
municipalities liable under section 1983. The Court seems to be
sending a message that all possible benefit of the doubt should be
given to municipalities to protect them from liability. If there are
two conceivable interpretations of the law, courts should take the
one that favors the municipality, even if that is not the more plau-
sible of the two interpretations. I believe the Court is leaning in
one of two directions: 1) either eliminating municipal liability al-
together and returning to the pre-Monell days, or 2) limiting
municipal liability not just to extreme cases, but to those cases
where the culpability of the municipality itself is beyond doubt.
2 5
224. Id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
225. MoneU itself was just such a case. There, New York City and the New York Board of
Education had a policy that compelled pregnant employees to take leaves of absence, even
if such a leave was not medically necessary. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
661 (1978). The Supreme Court declared such policies unconstitutional in its 1974 decision
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In Mone, there was no question
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This trend is also evident in the other municipal liability case
decided by the Court in the 1996-97 Term, Board of County Com-
22
missioners v. Brown.26 In May 1991, Jill Brown and her husband
were driving from Texas to Oklahoma when they approached a
police checkpoint.22 7 Mr. Brown, who was driving, opted to avoid
the checkpoint and turned around to head back to Texas.2 Two
Bryan County Sheriff's deputies pursued the Browns.229 The parties
dispute what happened next, but Mr. Brown testified that he was
unaware of the deputies behind him. The deputies testified that
the chase reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour.23° Once
the Browns' car was pulled over, the Court states:
Deputy Sheriff Morrison pointed his gun toward the Browns'
vehicle and ordered the Browns to raise their hands. Reserve
Deputy Burns, who was unarmed, rounded the corner of the
vehicle on the passenger's side. Burns twice ordered respon-
dent Jill Brown from the vehicle. When she did not exit, he
used an "arm bar" technique, grabbing [her] arm at the wrist
and elbow, pulling her from the vehicle, and spinning her to
the ground. [Her] knees were severely injured, and she later
underwent corrective surgery. Ultimately, she may need knee
231
replacements.
As a result of this incident, Jill Brown filed a section 1983 action
against Reserve Deputy Burns, the Bryan County Sheriff (B.J.
Moore), and the county itself.232 Her suit alleged that the county
was liable for Burns' use of excessive force.23 She premised her
allegations on Sheriff Moore's failure to adequately review Burns'
background prior to hiring him.34 Burns was the son of Moore's
nephew and had a criminal record that included misdemeanor
infractions for assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public
drunkenness, among other things. s Sheriff Moore testified at trial
about whether the municipality itself had approved the constitutional violation-that was
plain on the face of the policy. See Monell 436 U.S. at 661 n.2. While these cases may be
more simple to litigate, both for the parties and the courts, these are often the cases that do
not even make it into litigation now, as liability is plainly evident.
226. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).




231. Id. at 400-01.
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that he had obtained Burns' record but did not review it closely. 36
After he hired Burns, Moore authorized Burns to make arrests, but
he did not allow him to carry a weapon or operate a patrol car.237 A
jury found the county liable for Brown's injuries, the county ap-
pealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.238
The parties did not dispute that Sheriff Moore was the final
policymaker for the County regarding the sheriff's department.239
Thus, unlike in McMillian, the dispute was not over the Sheriff's
status.240 Rather, the dispute in Brown centered around whether the
Sheriff's actions were sufficient to constitute a policy.2 1 Put in
more technical language, the issue in Brown was whether a single
hiring decision by a municipal policymaker can amount to a
"policy" sufficient to subject the municipality itself to section 1983
liability.
242
Brown is not the first case in which the Supreme Court con-
fronted this issue. The issue arose over a decade ago in City of
243Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. In Tuttle, the widow of a man killed by a
police officer filed suit alleging that the city failed to train its po-
lice officers adequately. 244 The Court refused to impose liability
based on the facts of Tuttle, but it left the door open to the possi-
bility of liability in a future case. 5 That opportunity came one year
later in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati.246 In Pembaur, a badly fractured
majority held that a municipality could be held liable for a single
decision of a county prosecutor who instructed deputies to forcibly
enter an office in violation of the Fourth Amendment.24 7 The
prosecutor was the final policymaker for the municipality on such
issues.248
The tensions behind such a decision are obvious. On one hand,
holding a municipality liable for a single decision by a municipal
policymaker skirts very close to the line between holding a mu-
nicipality liable for its policies and holding it liable under
respondeat superior for the actions of its employees. On the other
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 402; Brown v. Bryan County, 67 F.3d 1174 (5th Cir. 1995).
239. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 401.
240. See supra notes 198-225 and accompanying text.
241. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.
242. See id.
243. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
244. See id. at 812-13.
245. See id. at 824.
246. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
247. See id. at 480.
248. See id. at 485.
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hand, when these single decisions carry the force of policy, a mu-
nicipality should not escape liability simply because the issue
presents a close call. How does a court determine the difference
between a municipal policy and an act of an employee when the
employee in question is responsible for making municipal policy?
Although we can argue over whether such a line should exist,249 the
Court's "custom or policy" requirement makes such lines necessary
in municipal liability cases.
The Brown decision from the 1996-97 Term amply illustrates
these difficulties, as well as provides some strong indicators about
how the Court will handle these cases in the future. As in McMil-
lian, the Court split 5-4, with the majority holding that Bryan
County was not liable for the single failure of its Sheriff to ade-
quately screen his great nephew's background prior to hiring
him.250 Although the majority, which consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
did not foreclose the possibility that a municipality could be held
liable for a single decision of one of its policymakers the Court's
analysis will make it very difficult for future plaintiffs to establish
such liability.
Justice O'Connor explained the underlying philosophy of the
decision in a rather ominous paragraph placed early in the analyti-
cal section:
As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates....
it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify con-
duct properly attributable to the municipality. [252] The
plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the
injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the munici-
pal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability
249. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented in Brown, argu-
ing that such line drawing exercises are inherently troublesome: "Given the basic Monell
principle, these distinctions may be necessary, for without them, the Court cannot easily
avoid a 'municipal liability' that 'collaps[es] into respondeat superior.' ... But a basic legal
principle that requires so many such distinctions to maintain its legal life may not deserve
such longevity." Brown, 520 U.S. at 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting majority opinion); see also Kinports, supra note 186.
250. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
251. Seeid.at399.
252. See id. at 412.
253. Whether this is a true statement about prior cases is debatable, but it does accu-
rately represent the post-Brown status of section 1983jurisprudence.
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and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the mu-
nicipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
254
The majority opinion then distinguished among municipal poli-
cies that intentionally deprive a person of a constitutional right,
policies that violate other federal laws, and policies that in and of
themselves are legal. 55 With the first two types of policies, the viola-
tion of federal law itself and the causal connection between the
violation and plaintiff's harm are treated the same.256 If the mu-
nicipal policy itself is illegal or commands that someone perform
an illegal act, the plaintiff generally need only establish that the
policy exists. 257 The violation of federal law and the causal connec-
tion between the policy and plaintiff's harm will be immediately
obvious. The third type of policy, however, requires additional lev-
els of proof. If the policy itself is legal, the plaintiff must then
produce additional evidence to establish that he or she suffered a
deprivation of a federally-protected right and that the policy was
the direct cause of the violation. 58
Jill Brown's suit falls into this third circumstance because Sheriff
Moore did not violate federal law by hiring his great nephew, de-
spite the nephew's prior encounters with the law. Sheriff Moore
also did not directly order his great nephew to use excessive force
260in the encounter with Brown. While the court does not enumer-
ate a formal test, it does indicate that to succeed in holding Bryan
County liable for her injuries Brown needed to prove that:
* Sheriff Moore inadequately screened his great
nephew's driving and criminal records;
261
* An adequate screening of those records would have
plainly revealed that his great nephew was not
qualified for the position of Reserve Deputy;2
62
* Burns used excessive force in the encounter with Jill
Brown, thereby depriving her of a constitutional
right;2 63 and
254. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.
255. See id. at 404-07.
256. See id. at 404-05.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 406-07.
259. See id. at 405.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 411-12.
262. Id. at 412.
263. See id. at 414.
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A causal connection existed between Moore's and
264Burns' actions.
As the majority noted, these inadequate screening cases carry an
inherent risk of blurring the line between the type of municipal
liability approved in Monell and improper respondeat superior liabil-
ity:
Where a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim premised upon the
inadequacy of an official's review of a prospective applicant's
record.. . there is a particular danger that a municipality will
be held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliberate
action attributable to the municipality itself. Every injury suf-
fered at the hands of a municipal employee can be traced to a
hiring decision in a "but-for" sense: But for the municipality's
decision to hire the employee, the plaintiff would not have
suffered the injury. To prevent municipal liability for a hiring
decision from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a
court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's
inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged.
... A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision
reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a
particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the deci-
sion. Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's
background would lead a reasonable policymaker to con-
clude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to
hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's
federally protected right can the official's failure to ade-
quately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute
"deliberate indifference." 5
As Justice Souter noted in his dissent, although this test is strin-
gent, it does comport with prior precedent. 266 What is most trouble-
some, however, is the way in which the majority applied the test to
the facts of this case.267
264. See id.
265. Id.at410-11.
266. See id. at 419-20 (SouterJ., dissenting).
267. Justice Souter agrees:
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The majority declared that the district court improperly in-
structed the jury, resulting in a jury decision that did not properly
test this "link" between Moore's failure to screen his great
nephew's background adequately and the great nephew's use of
excessive force as to Jill Brown.2 6 The majority then reviewed the
evidence in response to Brown's claim that Burns' record revealed
"such a strong propensity for violence that Burns' application of
excessive force was highly likely."269 The Court's review of Burns'
record revealed that:
" Burns was involved in a fight on a college campus,
resulting in misdemeanor charges of assault and
battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness;
2 0
" Burns had pleaded guilty to a number of driving
violations, "including nine moving violations and a
charge of driving with a suspended license;",2 7 and
* Burns had also pleaded guilty to controlling a vehi-
cle while intoxicated.272
While Burns was clearly an inappropriate choice to serve as a dep-
uty, it is arguable that his record may not have provided sufficient
notice to the Sheriff regarding a propensity for violence.
Two factors, however, are immediately obvious upon reading
the majority opinion. First, the district court's actual instructions
to the jury, as quoted in the majority opinion,271 come very close to
the standard articulated by the Court. The district court instructed
the jury that, to impose liability, they must find that Brown proved
the Sheriff's inadequate screening "was 'so likely to result in viola-
At the level of practice, however, the tenor of the Court's opinion is decidedly differ-
ent.... [T]he Court's skepticism converts a newly-demanding formulation of the
standard of fault into a virtually categorical impossibility of showing it in a case like
this; and the record in this case is perfectly sufficient to support the jury's verdict
even on the Court's formulation of the high degree of risk that must be shown.
Id. at 420-21 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion. See id. at 416 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a separate
dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, calling for a reexamination of the princi-
ple that section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability for municipalities. See id. at
430-37 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 411-14.
269. Id. at413.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 414.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 411-12.
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tions of constitutional rights' that the Sheriff could 'reasonably [be]
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional needs
of the Plaintiff.' ,274 The judge also instructed the jury that Brown
must prove that "the 'inadequate hiring ... policy directly caused
the Plaintiff's injury.' ,,275 These instructions directed the jury to
look for a close causal connection between Moore's and Bums'
actions, and the jury's verdict in favor of Brown declared that they
found just such a connection. The only difference between the
jury instructions and the Court's test is that the instructions did
not specifically require that Burns' record demonstrate his pro-
pensity to cause exactly the type of harm suffered by Brown.
Brown's theory, however, was that Bums' record demonstrated a
propensity for violence, and indeed he used unnecessary force in
216pulling her out of the vehicle. Thus, it is likely that the combina-
tion of Brown's theory and the judge's instructions resulted in the
jury using the proper degree of specificity in measuring the causal
connection.
This leads to the second factor that leaps out from the majority
opinion. Bums' record revealed instances of assault and battery
and a number of driving violations. 77 After hiring Burns, Sheriff
Moore refused to allow him to carry a gun or operate a patrol
car.27 8 I find it very curious that these two prohibitions reflect the
infractions listed on Burns' record. Thus, it appears that Moore
was engaging in nepotism by hiring an unqualified family member
but at the same time was aware that Burns might harm members of
the public. Accordingly, Moore tried to limit the possibilities for
harm by taking away his great-nephew's gun and by not allowing
him to drive a patrol car. These precautions, however, proved in-
adequate. Burns still inflicted great harm upon a member of the
public-Jill Brown.
Repeatedly throughout the Brown opinion, the majority dis-
cussed the need to protect municipalities from undue liability.2v9 It
would appear, however, that the Court is going to protect munici-
palities from liability even when a final municipal policymaker acts
in his official capacity to hire a grievously unqualified family mem-
ber to serve in a public safety role. The Court will continue to
protect the municipality even when that final municipal policy-
maker expresses knowledge of the propensity for harm by not
274. Id. (quoting thejury instructions).
275. Id. at 412 (quoting thejury instructions).
276. See id. at 413.
277. See id. at 413-14.
278. Seeid. at 401.
279. See id. at 403-15.
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allowing that family member to use the same tools of office as
other employees. The majority is either laying the groundwork to
eliminate municipal liability for a single action by one of its poli-
cymakers, or the Court is planning to limit such liability to
instances where the policy itself violates federal law. Either position
might simplify matters for courts and for municipalities, but it does
so at the cost ofjustice for plaintiffs.
D. Overlap with Habeas
To reiterate, section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for
vindicating the deprivation of constitutional rights by state offi-
cials. It is not the only statute, however, that addresses this
situation. On one level of generality, the habeas corpus statutes
also provide a procedural mechanism for vindicating the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights by state officials. 20 To be sure, the
habeas statutes address a more specific instance-judicial proceed-
ings 81-than section 1983, which addresses a broader spectrum of
constitutional deprivations. How should a court handle a case that
conceivably fits under both statutes? The Supreme Court ad-
dressed this question in its 1996-97 Term in the case of Edwards v.
Balisok.
8 2
It simply is not possible to discuss Balisok in isolation; one must
first understand the history of the Court's jurisprudence in this
area. That history begins in 1973 with the case of Preiser v.
Rodriguez. 82 Preiser was a section 1983 action filed by three prison-
ers who alleged that they had been deprived of good time credits
without due process of law.284 All three plaintiffs sought restoration
of their good time credits as the only remedy for the purported
violation.285 The language of both the habeas statutes and section
1983 covered the facts as alleged. The Supreme Court resolved
the dilemma by holding that, since the habeas statute is the more
specific of the two, it provides the sole means for challenging the
fact or duration of physical confinement.287 In seeking to reinstate
their good time credits, the Preiser plaintiffs were trying essentially
280. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 15.1, at 779-81.
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
282. 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
283. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
284. See id. at 476.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 482-84, 488-89.
287. See id. at 489-90.
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to decrease the duration of their confinement, so they were re-
281quired to proceed under the habeas statutes.
The habeas statutes are not quite as favorable as section 1983 for
prisoner plaintiffs because such statutes contain a state exhaustion
requirement and do not allow for the award of monetary dam-
ages.2 8 The Supreme Court addressed these differences in dicta in
the Preiser decision, asserting that a prisoner who is seeking solely
damages as a remedy could proceed under section 1983, and that a
prisoner seeking both damages and restoration of good time credits
could bifurcate his claims and proceed simultaneously under both
statutes.9 °
After seeming to reaffirm this dicta the next year in Wolff v.
McDonnell,29' the Supreme Court did not revisit this issue for two
decades until the case of Heck v. Humphrey. 2 2 While both Preiser and
Wolff involved state prison disciplinary proceedings, Heck was a
challenge to various allegedly unconstitutional acts that resulted in
the plaintiffs arrest and conviction on voluntary manslaughter
charges.2 9 The section 1983 action was filed during the pendency
of Heck's direct appeal from his criminal conviction. 94 In his sec-
tion 1983 action, however, Heck sought only damages, not
injunctive relief or release from custody.295 The Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the line drawn in Preiser and Wolffby declaring:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his con-
viction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the convic-
296tion or sentence has already been invalidated.
288. See id. at 500.
289. SeeCHEMERNSKY, supra note 19, § 15.4.2.
290. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498 n.14 & 499.
291. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). This suit was a section 1983 class action alleging that Ne-
braska prison disciplinary procedures violated the due process rights of Nebraska state
prisoners. The Court allowed the suit to proceed, provided that the challenge to the proce-
dures themselves was divorced from a challenge to the results of the proceedings. See id. at
579.
292. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
293. See id. at 478-79.
294. See id. at 479.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 487. Although it was not explicitly discussed, the Supreme Court did hear a
case in its 1996-97 Term that complied with the Heck rule. McMillian v. Monroe County was a
section 1983 action brought against county investigators for actions that resulted in the
conviction of an innocent man. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 1736
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The corollary, of course, is that if the section 1983 suit would not
"necessarily imply" the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, the
court may proceed to hear the suit.
297
As is readily obvious, Heck did not clarify matters.298 If anything,
it further complicated the existing scheme. After Heck, litigants
and courts cannot look just at the remedy sought to determine
whether the suit should proceed under the habeas statutes or un-
der section 1983. Instead, that inquiry becomes the first step. If a
litigant seeks only damages, a court must also examine the
"necessary implications" of any decision in the plaintiffs favor. In
addition, a prior question exists in suits challenging prison disci-
plinary proceedings-whether Heck is even applicable in those
suits. Perhaps the Heck rule applies only in the context of criminal
trials. Although the rationale in Heck could be twisted either way,
the Court did not provide much guidance for lower courts on this
299issue. In creating these "Preiser Puzzles," 00 the Court has created
a series of strange distinctions-bifurcating suits based on reme-
dies, introducing all sorts of res judicata and collateral estoppel
(1997). The suit was filed only after McMillian's criminal conviction had been vacated. See
id.; supra text accompanying note 202.
297. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.
298. For a more detailed explanation of Heck, see Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Ele-
ments of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 695, 711-29 (1997); see also Eric J.
Savoy, Comment, Heck v. Humphrey: What Should State Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages
from State Officials... Section 1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?, 22 NEW ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 109 (1996).
299. ProfessorJack Beermann has argued that Heck should not be extended beyond its
facts:
There has been one major extension of Heck beyond challenges to convictions. In
addition to damages actions challenging convictions, lower courts have applied Heck
to bar damages actions directed at unconstitutional procedures in prison disciplinary
hearings and parole hearings. This extension of Heck has been made in the face of
Supreme Court precedent directly to the contrary, but inspired by dicta in Heck it-
self.... The courts that have applied Heck to all damages claims challenging parole
and disciplinary hearings have ignored Heck's basis in the elements of the malicious
prosecution tort, from which the favorable termination requirement is derived. In-
stead, they have applied Heck as if it were an extension of the Preiser v. Rodriguez
ban.... Without the elements analysis, there is no basis for applying Heck in this con-
text.
Beermann, supra note 298, at 715-17 (footnotes omitted); see also Savoy, supra note 298, at
138 (arguing that Heck "has made a complex area of law more complicated"). We now
know that the lower courts were correct and that the Supreme Court itself also ignored the
original context of Heck and extended its rule to prison disciplinary hearings. See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997).
300. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle. Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the
Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 87-88
(1988).
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problems, and creating a sea of confusing rules and duplicative
work for federal judges. °'
The Court revisited this confusing thicket in its 1996-97 Term
with its decision in Edwards v. Balisok. 02 Although the factual rec-
ord is somewhat sparse,03 this case appears to be a fairly typical
prisoner civil rights action. Indeed, what stands out most about the
suit is not its background, but rather the fact that the plaintiff was
represented by counsel; most prisoner suits proceed pro se.
The case began in 1993 when Jerry Balisok, a prisoner in the
custody of Washington state, was accused of violating the prison
disciplinary code.04 In preparation for his hearing, Balisok re-
quested that the hearing officer obtain a statement from an inmate
named John Stein and submit questions to two other inmates.0 5 At
the hearing, the hearing officer told Balisok that none of the three
inmates responded to the inquiries.3°r The officer then found Bali-
sok guilty of the charged offense and imposed a punishment that
included loss of 30 days good time credit.
3 0 7
Later, Balisok was able to review his file, which apparently con-
tained the three requested statements, all dated prior to the time
of the hearing.3 8 Balisok then instituted his section 1983 action in
federal district court, alleging several violations of his procedural
due process rights.3 0a In particular, Balisok asserted that the state-
ments were concealed as part of a pattern of behavior by state
correctional officers, who sought retribution against 'jail house
attorneys."3 0 Balisok's complaint was carefully structured to seek
only damages and injunctive relief; in accordance with the dictates
of Preiser, Wolff and Heck, Balisok did not attempt to have his lost
good time credits reinstated.3 1 ' Despite Balisok's (and his attor-
ney's) careful attempts to structure the complaint, the district
301. For more discussion about the problems these decisions have raised for prisoners,
as well as for lower courts, see id. at 123-29; and Michael Weinman, To Stay or Not to Stay:
Choosing a Procedural Course for Prisoners' Suits Stating Claims Under Both Section 1983 and Ha-
beas Corpus, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (1991).
302. 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
303. This is a result of the procedural posture of the case, as it arrived at the Supreme
Court after the district court granted a motion to dismiss and was overruled by the Ninth
Circuit. See id. at 644.
304. See id. at 643.
305. See Brief of Respondent at *2, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (No. 95-
1352), available in 1996 WL 492348 [hereinafter Respondent's Briefi.
306. See id.
307. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643.
308. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 305, at *2.
309. See id. at *3-4.
310. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648.
311. Seeid. at645.
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court stayed the action, pending state-court action on the restora-
tion of the credits.3 1 ' The Ninth Circuit reversed, 313 and the stage
was set for the Supreme Court to hear the case.
3 1 4
312. See id. at 644.
313. See id.
314. See id. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Edwards v. Balisok on Novem-
ber 13, 1996. See id. at 641. In the week prior to that hearing, I wrote a short preview of the
case for West's Legal News. See Melissa L. Koehn, Dividing the Indivisible: The Supreme Court
Once Again Faces the Overlap of Habeas and Section 1983, West's Legal News, Nov. 8, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 646787. After reviewing the procedural history of the case, as well as
the development of the law in this area, I examined the arguments made by both sides in
their briefs. See id. at *3. I then concluded:
As in previous cases addressing this issue, both sides present compelling theoretical
and practical arguments. The Court's answer will depend on how it chooses to view
Balisok's claim.
On one hand, the vast majority of prisoner civil rights litigation takes place through
section 1983. The essence of Balisok's case, like other prisoner actions, is a challenge
to the conditions and restrictions of prison life. Balisok is contesting the abuse of
power that often occurs by corrections officers. He is not challenging the state's deci-
sion to imprison him. In addition, most prisoners want both damages and a
restoration of good time credits as part of their challenges to prison disciplinary pro-
cedures. Does it really make sense to bifurcate these claims according to the remedy?
It would seem to make more sense to allow them to be brought as section 1983 ac-
tions, perhaps with a requirement that prisoners must first complete the internal
prison appellate process before filing a claim in federal court. This would streamline
federal judicial proceedings and prevent the unwarranted duplication caused by bi-
furcation.
On the other hand, the Court could also eliminate bifurcation by mandating that
all attacks on prison disciplinary procedures be brought through habeas corpus. The
Court could achieve this objective by analogizing Balisok's prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding to a trial. Both seek to determine whether an accused is guilty of
wrongdoing, and both involve various procedures to protect the accuracy of the fact
finding process. The habeas corpus statute exists to balance the importance of com-
ity between the federal and state governments with the paramount interest of
protecting constitutional rights. No doubt exists that the "core" of the habeas statute
is to guard against inadvertent or deliberate constitutional deprivations by state judi-
cial officers. The primary problem with this, however, is that the habeas corpus
statute contains no mechanism for awarding damages, and cannot easily be con-
strued to allow such a remedy. It would be a much shorter stretch to allow
restoration of good time credits as part of the remedy in a section 1983 action.
.. [lI]t is not immediately clear why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ed-
wards v. Balisok. The Court may simply be planning to declare that the Heck rule,
established in the context of a challenge to trial and sentencing, also applies in the
context of prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court may also be planning to create
a different rule for the prisoner context or to abandon Preiser and Heck altogether.
While it is impossible to predict how the Court will rule . .. ,one thing is foresee-
able: [everyone involved with these cases] will be anxiously awaiting the decision and
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Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, started his opinion
by reiterating the Heck rule.315 After summarizing the factual and
procedural history of the case, he noted that the allegations in
Heck and in Balisok are similar: both plaintiffs alleged that state of-
ficials concealed or destroyed exculpatory evidence, greatly
hampering the section 1983 plaintiffs' ability to defend them-
selves. 316 The Court noted that Balisok did not seek restoration of
good time credits, but announced that this was not enough in light
of the Heck rule, which "clearly envisioned . . . that the nature of
the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to
imply the invalidity of the judgment."3 1 7
Balisok argued that his allegations did not necessarily imply the
invalidity of his sentence, as evidence was presented at his hearing
to support the hearing officer's finding of guilt.3  According to
Balisok, Washington follows a "some or any evidence" standard,
which means that a court will uphold a hearing officer's decision if
some evidence was presented at the hearing that would support
the result.39 Balisok contended that his evidence, although proba-
tive, would not necessarily have changed the hearing officer's
mind. Thus, he argued, his case did not fall on the "habeas" side of
the line established in Heck.
°20
Justice Scalia declared that this argument was "incorrect," as Bal-
isok was not attacking the sufficiency of the evidence. 32' Under a
literal interpretation of the Heck rule, however, that argument can-
not be incorrect. Indeed, it is the very heart of the matter. If
evidence existed to support the hearing officer's decision, regard-
less of whether Balisok's evidence was presented, then the lack of
the evidence does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the result.
That result-specifically the revocation of good time credits-
hoping that the Supreme Court issues some definitive, workable, and helpful guide-
lines for handling these cases.
Id. at *4-5.
Once the actual decision came down on May 19, 1997, I went back and read these words
with some incredulity at my own naivete. I had forgotten two fundamental principles. First,
the Supreme Court has never brought any common sense or logic to these decisions in the
past, so there was no reason to expect they would now. Second, I forgot the principle that
has formed the theme of this paper: the Supreme Court tends to seize every opportunity to
make things difficult and complicated for prisoners and for those involved in prisoner
cases.
315. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643.
316. See id. at 644.
317. Id. at 645.
318. See id. at 647-48.
319. See id. at 647.
320. See id. at 645.
321. See id. at 646-47.
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might have been different if Balisok had been able to present his
evidence, but under the wording of the Heck rule, "might" is not
enough to force Balisok into the habeas statutes.322 Unless the re-
sult would have been different, the Heck rule should not prevent
Balisok from seeking damages for any deprivations of his proce-
dural due process rights.
Thus, in order to reach its result in Balisok, the Supreme Court
could not have meant what it said. The Heck rule must be re-
phrased to state that a section 1983 plaintiff cannot proceed if hisS• 323
allegations could possibly result in invalidating the proceeding. In
the context of a challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings, this
essentially would mean that if good time credits were revoked as
part of the sentence, then a prisoner seeking to challenge the
hearing procedures must do so through a petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus.
The Court's decision thus accomplishes two things. First, it not
only fails to clarify the law in this area, it actually further compli-
cates matters. By enunciating one test and applying another, the
Court has provided more mixed signals that will impose greater
difficulties on lower courts wrestling with these cases. 24 Second,
the Court has made it very difficult for plaintiffs and their attor-
neys seeking to bring these types of challenges. 25 Jerry Balisok was
ably represented by an attorney who appeared to follow the rule
laid down by the Court in Heck, yet it took three judicial decisions
(the district court,326 the Ninth Circuit,327  and the Supreme
Court328 ) to determine that his case fell on the "wrong" side of the
Heck line. In issuing these decisions, however, the courts did not
provide any meaningful guidance for future attorneys, litigants,
and judges faced with these decisions. Thus, the Court all but
guaranteed that these cases will continue to consume large
amounts of resources for uncertain results.
322. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 ("IT]he district court must consider whether a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.")
(emphasis added).
323. In my preview of the oral arguments, I called this argument "dangerous" and im-
plied that it was not a sound one. See Koehn, supra note 314, at *4. It appears the defense
attorneys were more in tune with the Supreme Court than I was.
324. SeeWerner, supra note 4, at 680 (discussing the confusion that the Court's decision
in Balisok will create among lower courts).
325. See id. at 678-79 (discussing how the Court's decision in Balisok has essentially
foreclosed these types of prisoner actions).
326. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 644 (discussing the district court decision).
327. See Balisok v. Edwards, 70 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 1995) (table case).
328. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 641.
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These burdens are magnified by two additional complicating
factors. First, the Court noted that its decision applied only to the
portions of Balisok's complaint seeking damages.129 Balisok also
requested prospective injunctive relief to prevent prison officials
from continuing their alleged practice of withholding witness
statements from 'jail house attorney[s]. '"o The Court noted that
"[o]rdinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief will not
'necessarily imply' the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time
credits, and so may properly be brought under [section] 1983." 33'
Of course, Balisok must satisfy the standing requirements as well as
the usual prerequisites for injunctive relief before he can be
awarded such relief.32 Because the lower courts had not addressed
these claims, the Court left those issues for consideration on re-
mand.33  In addition, in a short concurring opinion, Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer indicated that they joined in the
main opinion with the understanding that it was limited to Bali-
sok's allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the hearing
officer.334 Balisok's other allegations, such as the hearing officer's
failure to specify the facts and evidence supporting his finding,
could be maintained under section 1983, as they did not necessar-
ily imply the invalidity of the sentence.335 Six justices, however,
refused to sign onto this concurrence, giving the impression that
all of Balisok's damages claims were improper under section 1983.
This division, however, might lead to future confusion by lower
courts over the definition of "necessarily imply." In any event, the
divvying up of Balisok's claims according to remedy does not make
much sense. This practice will certainly confuse lower courts, as
well as multiply their workload. Not only will the lower courts be
faced with the complicated task of applying the Heck rule as modi-
fied in Balisok, but a proper application of that principle might
turn one lawsuit into two or even three separate suits, despite the
fact that they all arise out of the same set of circumstances. This, of
course, will lead to all sorts of complications regarding res judicata
and collateral estoppel.
A second complicating factor arises following the enactment of
two relevant statutes: the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995336
329. See id. at 648-49.
330. Id. at 648 (alteration in original).
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 649.
334. See id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
335. See id. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
336. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (codified in tides 28 and 42
U.S.C.). The Act was passed as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appro-
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and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."17
Both laws set strict limitations on the number and/or timing of
section 1983 lawsuits brought by prisoners and on habeas peti-
tions. 38 If prisoners represented by counsel cannot figure out the
Court's jurisprudence in this area, how can pro se prisoners be ex-
pected to figure it out? What if a prisoner, either represented by
counsel or proceeding pro se, chooses the incorrect cause of ac-
tion? How is the court required to operate under these statutes?
The answers to these questions are outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, but they do present considerations that courts will inevitably
confront.
Thus, as all four sections in Part II demonstrate, the Court's re-
cent cases have complicated life for many civil rights plaintiffs. In
the next part of this Article, I speculate about the Court's possible
motivations and how they might be used to predict future trends.
III. WHAT IS MOTIVATING THE COURT?
As Part II of this Article demonstrates, the theme of protecting
state sovereignty resounds throughout the Court's section 1983
jurisprudence from the 1996-97 Term. Indeed, this theme appears
to be the primary motivating factor behind many of the key deci-
sions from that Term. In its mildest form, this policy of protecting
states led the Court to reaffirm the established proposition that
states are not "persons" for purposes of section 1983.'39 In its
strongest form, it led the Court to restrict possible areas of mu-
nicipal liability.34° In its most insidious form, it led the Court to
weaken the long-established principles of Ex parte Young.
34
priations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, better known as the federal
budget.
337. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254).
338. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. 111996) (limiting second and suc-
cessive petitions); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (Supp. II 1996) (establishing a one year statute of
limitations); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp. 111996) (prohibiting a prisoner from filing further
suits if three prior suits were dismissed for failure to state a claim).
339. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (citing Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
340. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 1740 (1997) (holding that Ala-
bama sheriffs represent the state, not the county); Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 415 (1997) (holding that where a sheriff hired an employee who later employed
excessive force, the decision to hire must reflect a "conscious disregard of an obvious risk
that a use of excessive force would follow").
341. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2043 (1997) (finding
the Exparte Youngexception inapplicable to the facts of the case).
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This motivation is a subset of the increasing trend toward ex-
panding states' rights that is finding voice across the spectrum of
the Court's jurisprudence. It is perhaps more pronounced in sec-
tion 1983 cases, as the Court tends to view them as largely frivolous
and as causing a drain on state and local treasuries, not to mention
on the court system itself. 2 In some respect, these feelings are un-
derstandable. A large number of section 1983 suits do fit this
description. A large number of civil cases in general, however,
would fit the description of "frivolous," because we live in a liti-
gious society.343 I find it very disturbing that the Court seems
willing to throw out the baby with the bath water when it comes to
section 1983 suits. Just because some percentage of section 1983
suits are frivolous does not mean that they are all a waste of time.
Section 1983 provides a mechanism for vindicating constitutional
rights, arguably the most important rights in our system. Yet the
Court seems determined to create a system of picayune procedural
rules designed to favor both section 1983 defendants and the
courts, to make it easy to dismiss these cases prior to trial regard-
less of their underlying merits.
This "protect the defendants" mentality is also disturbing given
the original motivations and purposes behind section 1983-that
citizens needed a mechanism to restrain states and their employees
from violating their constitutional rights.3 4 Over the past 100
years, however, we have moved from distrusting states to bending
over backward to protect them. Although circumstances have
changed, and perhaps states are more trustworthy now, it is also
true that section 1983 liability provided a large incentive for state
and local governments to clean up their acts. The more the Court
cuts back on the feasibility of a victory by section 1983 plaintiffs,
the more it weakens or even eliminates those incentives.
The "protect the states" motivation has also brought with it, ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally, a hierarchy of people and of
rights entitled to protection. Regardless of intent, this trend is (or
should be) very troublesome. A look at the winners and losers in
the cases surveyed above helps to illustrate this trend. Of the seven
cases analyzed in Part II, six of them were victories for state and/or
local government: Arizonans for Official English,3 5 Coeur dAlene
342. See supra Part II.
343. I would be very interested in comparing the percentage of section 1983 cases dis-
missed as frivolous to the percentage of civil cases as a whole, but that is a topic for another
Article.
344. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 8.2, at 426-27 (stating that section 1983 gave
federal courts authority to protect federal rights).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 47-61.
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Tribe, ' 46 Fankell,347 McMillian, 34 Brown, 4 and Balisok 5° Arizonans for
Official English was probably the least noxious of these, as it simply
reaffirmed the established principle that states are not "persons"
under section 1983. Coeur d'Alene Tribe expanded this principle,
however, by reducing the scope of Ex parte Young and decreasing
potential liability of state officials sued in their individual capacity.
Fankell, an ostensible plaintiffs victory, is actually much more fa-
vorable to states. Although the Court refused to require that states
allow interlocutory appeals on the issue of qualified immunity, de-
fendants can easily circumvent that holding by exercising their
right to remove suits to federal court. Indeed, since defendants are
quite likely to do just that, Fankell likely will have the effect of en-
suring that virtually all section 1983 suits are litigated in the federal
system. 35' Thus, the plaintiffs victory is illusory, as it essentially will
be limited to this particular case.
McMillian and Brown directly benefit municipalities at the ex-
pense of plaintiffs. Both cases cut back on the liability of county
sheriffs' departments in situations where the system arguably
contributed to constitutional deprivations. Both cases appear to
limit liability to situations where the municipality itself adopted
an unconstitutional policy or directly ordered the doing of an un-
constitutional act. In Brown, the Court was more explicit about
this motive, and it reinforced the idea by formulating a strict test
for liability and applying that test even more strictly.3 52 The prin-
ciple was more subtle in McMillian, but the Court gave great
deference to state law provisions "labeling" a county employee as
a state employee.5  This deference has the potential to make it
easier for states to protect their municipalities by passing laws to
make municipal policymakers part of the state system in name
only, which will then disallow suits against municipal employees
in their official capacity. Although McMillian is limited on its
facts to Alabama county sheriffs, 54 the general principle has the
potential to apply to other states and other types of municipal
policymakers. We will have to wait and see how far the courts are
346. See supra text accompanying notes 75-91.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 134-47.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 198-225.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 226-72.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 302-22.
351. Although this might be seen as a potential boon-that federal rights are litigated
in the federal system-the pro-defendant slant of most section 1983 procedures will likely
cause this shift to be a detriment, rather than a benefit, to section 1983 plaintiffs.
352. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388-93; see also supra Part I.C.
353. See McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1737-40; see also supra Part I.C.
354. See supra Part I.C.
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willing to expand McMillian, but plaintiffs should fear the worst,
given the current trends.
Finally, Balisok is not an unmitigated state victory, but that will
likely be its ultimate result. First, the state actually prevailed in the
litigation. In one respect, the Court's decision is not quite as fa-
vorable to states, because it has the potential to increase litigation
costs. This possibility flows from the likelihood of duplicative litiga-
tion, as well as the likelihood of confusion by the courts. This
confusion will take many cases and many appeals to straighten out.
On a deeper level, however, by applying the Heck rule so that pris-
oners must proceed in habeas corpus whenever restoration of
good time credits is a possible remedy, the Court has sent these
cases into a forum that is much more favorable to the states. The
recent restrictions on habeas, embodied in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 35' ensure that a writ of habeas
probably will not be forthcoming in the vast majority of these358
cases. In addition, the Court has provided a mechanism through
which states can funnel almost all disputes over prisoner discipli-
nary hearings into habeas proceedings by generating rules that
make forfeiture of good time credits an automatic penalty whenever
a prisoner is found guilty of some misconduct after a disciplinary
hearing. The Heck/Balisok rule will then apply, requiring that any
prisoner challenges be brought through a petition for a writ of ha-
beas.
Thus, of the seven cases surveyed in this Article, only one-
Richardson-is a true plaintiff victory, and even that is a hollow one.
Although the Court held that private prison guards are not enti-
tled to the protection of qualified immunity,3 9 it left a gaping hole
by explicitly reserving the right to formulate some other type of
good faith defense for these defendants. 360 I think it quite likely,
given the anti-plaintiff bent of most section 1983 law, that such a
defense will not be long in forthcoming. Additionally, I cannot es-
cape noticing that Richardson was not a victory at the immediate
expense of a state or municipality. Remember, the defendants in
Richardson were not employed by either the state of Tennessee or
by any of its municipalities. 36' Thus, it could be argued that they
may have lost, not just for the history and policy reasons articu-
355. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649.
356. See discussion supra Part I.D.
357. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 336-38.
359. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102-03.
360. See id. at 2108.
361. See id. at 2102.
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lated by the Court, but also because they were not in a position to
take advantage of the "protect the state" motivation so prevalent in
other cases.
Who were the losers in these cases? Both municipal liability
cases resulted in a loss for plaintiffs who were injured by county
sheriffs or their employees. Granted, those plaintiffs can still pro-
ceed against the municipal employee in an individual capacity, but
both cases arguably involved wrongdoing attributable to the mu-
nicipality itself. They were both close calls, but the Court has made
it clear that close calls go to the defendant. Municipalities will be
held liable only in extraordinarily egregious cases. Coeur dAlene
Tribe, especially coming on the heels of Seminole Tribe, was a re-
sounding defeat for Indian tribes. State prisoners went one and
one, with a win in Richardson and a loss in Balisok. Of course, as dis-
cussed above, the win in Richardson may ultimately prove to be
illusory. The other plaintiffs victory, Fankell, will almost definitely
prove illusory. Even as a temporary victory, however, it benefited a
state employee suing her former employer, and not a prisoner or a
person suing a police department.
Obviously, these seven cases are not a sufficiently large sample
from which to argue definitively that the Supreme Court is creat-
ing a hierarchy of people and rights entitled to constitutional
protection. Indeed, they may simply reflect that a significant per-
centage of plaintiffs who file section 1983 actions are either
prisoners or are suing a police department. On the other hand, it
is hard to escape the fact that the result in most section 1983 deci-
sions can be explained through either or both of two theories:
either the Court is concerned with protecting state and municipal
governments from both liability and litigation costs or it is uncon-
cerned with protecting prisoners and plaintiffs who sue police
departments.
If a suit does not involve a state or municipality362 or if the suit
does not fit the stereotypical mold of a frivolous suit,36 3 then the
Court is much more willing to lower the procedural barriers pre-
venting a resolution on the merits of the suit. Richardson did this
(at least temporarily) by removing pretrial wrangling over quali-
fied immunity.36 Fankell also did this (again, at least temporarily)
by limiting the disruption and expense of interlocutory appeals on
the qualified immunity issue. 65 It almost seems as though the
362. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2101.
363. See Fanell, 117 S. Ct. at 1802.
364. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103; see also supra Part II.B, I.C.
365. See Fankel, 117 S. Ct. at 1802; see also supra Part II.B.
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Court's philosophy is that prisoner suits and suits against police
officers are almost never meritorious, so they should be eliminated
as quickly as possible. The barriers created by the Court, however,
apply equally to meritorious and nonmeritorious suits. Many
"stereotypical" section 1983 actions have merit and are at least a
close call as to whether liability should be imposed. The Court,
however, has created a system whereby these cases never get to the
merits; they are dismissed for stumbling on some procedural hur-
dle.
This system is reinforced when comparing the decisions ana-
lyzed above with the Court's decision in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency.366 Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped piece
of land near Lake Tahoe.367 The land in question fell under the
jurisdiction of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA),
which determined that her lot was ineligible for development.
The Agency did, however, determine that Suitum was entitled to
receive some transferable development rights, which were alleg-
edly very valuable.369 Suitum was not satisfied with this remedy and
filed a section 1983 suit, alleging that the TRPA had taken her
property "without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."
3 7
The sole issue before the Supreme Court concerned the ripe-
ness of the claim-whether Suitum had sufficiently completed the
state administrative procedures and obtained a "final decision."
3 7 1
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled that the claim
was not ripe, but the Supreme Court reversed those decisions.372
Apart from the substantive conclusion, what stands out most about
the Court's decision is that the Court went out of its way not only
to reach its conclusion that Suitum's claim was ripe, but in so do-
ing, it interpreted prior precedent rather liberally. Thus, a section
1983 plaintiff not only won a potentially close call, the Court nar-
rowed prior holdings to make that possible.
In contrast, in the seven cases analyzed in Part II, the Court ei-
ther held fast to prior precedent or even broadened it to achieve a
pro-state result. It is hard to escape the implication that the Court
is more willing to allow a takings claim, especially one not filed by
a prisoner, to proceed toward a resolution on the merits. The ar-
366. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
367. See id. at 1663.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 1662.
370. Id. at 1663.
371. Id. at 1664.
372. See id.
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guments existed and the case law would have supported a decision
that Suitum's claim was not ripe for adjudication. Such a result
would have provided protection for municipal planning boards, in
keeping with the generally pro-government results of other section
1983 decisions. Perhaps the difference lies, at least partially, in the




This Article has not presented (and has not attempted to pres-
ent) a scientifically and statistically valid model definitively
concluding that the Supreme Court is creating a hierarchy of per-
sons and rights entitled to protection. Instead, it has taken a more
limited approach, analyzing the major decisions from one Court
Term. These cases raise a troubling concern that, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally, the Supreme Court is creating a system
in which prisoners, Indians, and persons suing police departments
are not entitled to full constitutional protection. This failure to
provide full constitutional protection stems not from suits lacking
merit, but rather because the plaintiffs have stumbled onto one of
many procedural hurdles. This blanket preference for states and
municipalities at the expense of certain plaintiffs carries with it the
enormous risk of undermining section 1983. The blanket prefer-
ence also flies in the face of the idea that part of the mission of
373. As I admit in the text, the distinction between Suitum and the stereotypical section
1983 plaintiff can provide only a partial explanation for the different treatment the Court
gave her case. Supreme Court decisions can rarely, if ever, be explained by one simplistic
factor. Rather, a complex array of motivations generally underlie most opinions. I do not
mean to suggest otherwise with this Article. Instead, the purpose of this Article is to identify
one strand of explanations that is particularly insidious. My hope is that once that strand is
identified, people will begin to pay attention to it and question some of the Court's deci-
sions.
Two additional factors are likely lurking behind Suitum. The first of these is the Court's
marked hostility toward environmental protection efforts; these efforts were at the root of
the Tahoe Regional Planning Board's decision that Suitum could not develop the land in
question. The Court's hostility has been most evident in several standing decisions, includ-
ing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) and Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
The second factor revolves around the concept of transferable development rights
(TDRs). The Court originally addressed TDRs in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). TDRs play a substantial role in the Suitum case, and the Court
avoided explicitly accepting or rejecting the Penn Central approach. A more complete dis-
cussion of this thread is clearly beyond the scope of this Article, but a cogent analysis can be
found in Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et a]., Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives
After Suitum, 30 URB. LAw. 441 (1998).
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federal courts is to protect unpopular minorities from the depriva-
tion of their constitutional rights. The purpose of this Article,
however, is not to prove that such a blanket preference does exist.
Instead, the purpose is to suggest such a possibility, to raise a nig-
gling voice in the back of your mind every time you read a new
section 1983 decision from the Court.
